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Wiretapping’s Fruits, the First Amendment, and the Paradigms of Privacy
by Bernard W. Bell
The Supreme Court’s, and the legal system’s, treatment of privacy can profitably be
explored in terms of five paradigms.  These paradigms focus on physical location, the means of
communication, the means of intrusion, subject matter, and confidential relationships.  The
reliance on some, but not others in particular contexts serves to determine the results that the
Court reaches (or that statutes ordain), and the Court has systematically favored particular
paradigms in ways that often make privacy protections porous.
After setting forth the five privacy paradigms, I will examine the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper.1  There the Court addressed the constitutional validity of statutes
barring individuals who receive information derived from illegal wiretaps from disclosing that
information.  The Court took a law premised on one privacy paradigm, namely the means of
communication paradigm, and introduced a test premised upon a competing paradigm, the
subject matter paradigm.  Privacy was defined not in terms of the “private” nature of the means
of communication employed, but in terms of the “public” nature of the matters discussed.  The
choice the Court made between the two warring paradigms, one embodied in the wiretapping
statutes and the other embodied in the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, was significant in
itself.  In addition, the pre-eminence given to the subject matter analysis by Bartnicki v. Vopper 
threatens to remove any real constraint on use of information obtained from those who illegally
intercept conversations, because of the limited conception of “private” matters in the Court’s
First Amendment doctrine.  However, an alternative approach to distinguishing “public” and
“private” matters offers more protection for those engaged in communications intercepted by
miscreants and delivered to the press.
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2  See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT , THE HUM AN CONDITION  38-78 (1958) ("The only efficient way to
guarantee the darkness of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is private property, a privately owned
place to hide in.").
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I.  The Paradigms of Privacy
The myriad federal, state, and local laws that protect “privacy” do not reflect any
comprehensive definition of the concept.  Instead they incorporate a variety of more limited
privacy paradigms, each of which offers some protection based upon incomplete definitions of
privacy.  Each paradigm ultimately misses important aspects of our conception of privacy. 
Moreover, these paradigms differ radically and can often suggest conflicting resolutions of
privacy questions.  Courts or legislatures may tend to prefer some of the paradigms to others,
with significant doctrinal consequences.  The paradigms most useful in analyzing privacy law are
those of: (1) location, (2) means of communication, (3) means of intrusion, (4) subject matter,
and (5) confidential relationships.  I will address each in turn.
A.  The Location Paradigm
The legal system sometimes defines the entitlement to privacy in terms of the location of
an individual or a prospective intruder.  Thus, a couple’s argument may be viewed as private if it
occurs in an area from which others are excluded, but may be viewed as public if it takes place
on a public sidewalk.  In some senses then, people can determine whether particular matters are
“private” or “public” by deciding where to locate themselves when engaging in certain activities.2
Thus, the first of the five privacy paradigms I will explore is the paradigm of location. 
This paradigm has dominated the Supreme Court’s conception of  privacy in a number of
respects.  Location may help define privacy in two ways.  First, the Court, and the legal system
more generally, may enable citizens to limit others’ access to them or protect certain personal
information by allowing the individual to exclude potential intruders from a particular physical
space.  Thus, the legal system might focus on defining “private” and “public” spaces based on
legal and social norms.  It may then protect privacy by precluding individuals from intruding into
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3  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to
common-law trespass.").
4  Fourth Amendment analysis involves a two-step process. First, a court must determine whether law
enforcement officers have breached any reasonable expectation of privacy — in other words, the court must
determine whether the investigative target has any cognizable privacy interest at all.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  If the court concludes that the target did possess a legitimate expectation
of privacy, the court must then decide whether the Fourth Amendment permits the breach of that privacy expectation
— either because the police have secured a warrant after establishing probable cause, or because the breach fits
within one of numerous judicially-recognized  exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements. Id. at 367.
5  Taylor v. U.S., 286 U.S. 1, __ (1932)(garage); Amos v. U.S., 255 U.S. 313, ___ (1921)(store); See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, ___ (1967)(warehouse);  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIM INAL PROCEDURE § 3.2(a)
(3d ed. 2000).
6  See U.S. v. Jacobson, 466 U .S. 109, 123-24 (1984)(distinguishing opening suitcase without a warrant
from having a trained dog sniff the suitcase from outside to determine the presence of contraband narcotics).  See
pages __-__ infra (discussing the human body as a protected “location”).
-3-
private spaces without substantial justification.  Conversely, when an individual conducts his or
her activities in a public place, the legal system may deem those activities “public” in the sense
that those who view and discuss those activities breach no legally-recognized privacy interest.
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence heavily focuses on the location
paradigm; it protects privacy largely by protecting private property.3  The Court’s definition of
the “expectations of privacy” whose breach must be justified by probable cause, a warrant, or the
equivalent (i.e., some exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements) relies heavily on
location.4  For example, garage, store, and commercial warehouse interiors not visible from
outside are considered locations in which their owners have a reasonable expectation of privacy
(even though the activities that routinely take place on such premises might not be considered
“private” in and of themselves).  But that expectation of privacy exists solely because of the
areas’ inaccessibility to the public.5  A location can also be defined in terms of personal property;
thus a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a suitcase, so long
as others cannot perceive the contents of the suitcase without opening it.6
More controversially, some matters are deemed public because they take place in
locations the Court defines as public.  For example, homeowners have no expectation of privacy
in trash left in opaque bags at street curbs for collection by sanitation workers.  The Court viewed
such bags, and their contents, as “public” because any member of the public can take physical
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7   See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,.  For a contrasting approach, see State v. Hempele, 120 N.J.
182 (1990)(search of opaque garbage bags without warrant or reliance on an exception to the warrant requirement
violated the New Jersey Constitution).
8  In fact, some courts have noted that residential refuse often contains information that we consider very
private.  State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 201, 576 A.2d 793 (1990); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 662, 701 P.2d
1272 (1985).
9  Greenwood illustrates another aspect of the Courts doctrine, namely that the Court independently defines
expectations of privacy rather than incorporating legal entitlements established by statutes, regulations, or common
law.  Thus, in Greenwood, the Court accorded no significance to a local regulation prohibiting individuals from
rummaging through other’s garbage.  486 U .S. 43-44.   (Arguably, however, such regulations which are typical in
many areas, were initially enacted more out of a concern for public health than privacy. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. at
808.  The Court’s approach contrasts to its approach in determining which rights constitute “property” for purposes
of the Due Process Clause.  See Board  of Regents of State College v. Roth, 498 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
10  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986); Dow
chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANN E T. MCKENNA,
WIRETAPPING  AND EAVESDROPPING § 29:16 (2d ed. 1995). 
11  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-83 (1983) (treating surveillance of a  vehicle via a secretly
planted transmitter as the equivalent of surveillance by actual people along the vehicle's route).  For a contrasting
view, see State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. S. Ct. 2003).
12  United States v. Karo, 468 U .S. 705 (1984). 
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possession of the bag and rummage through it.7  The homeowner, then, relinquishes any right to
privacy in the information contained in such refuse, no matter how sensitive in terms of subject
matter,8 by taking the bag from a private place and leaving it in a public one.9  Similarly,
homeowners have no expectation of privacy in fenced-in back yards obscured from public view
at street level.  The yards are visible from publicly accessible space, namely airspace controlled
by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), and thus law enforcement officers can use
satellites, airplanes, or hovering helicopters to view and photograph such enclosed areas.10
The treatment of electronic tracking devices (like beepers or global positioning system
(“GPS”) monitoring devices), provides a third example of the Court’s approach.  Law
enforcement officers may place such  devices on items in an individual’s possession and monitor
the device as long as the item to which the device is attached remains in a public place.11 
However, once the device reveals information about events in a private location, even trivial
information such as opening a container of drug precursors, such monitoring violates an
expectation of privacy.12
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13  RESTATEMENT SECON D O F TORTS  § 652B .  While locational concepts are central in the text of the
Restatement provisions (e.g., “seclusion” and  “solitude”), the privacy vindicated by the cause of action is not solely
defined in terms of locations.  In particular, the tort may result from intrusion into “private affairs or concerns.”   For
a critique of the emphasis placed upon location in intrusion cases, see Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, ___ (1989)(“The privacy protected
by the common law tort cannot be reduced to objective facts like spatial distance or  information or observability; it
can only be understood by reference to norms of behavior.”) 
14 Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232  Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78 , 684-85 (Cal. Ct. App . 1986) (allowing plaintiff's
claim against a television crew who entered her home without permission to film emergency personnel attempting to
revive her husband); see Wilson v. Layne, 526 U .S. 603 (1999)(hold ing that police with warrants may not invite
third parties into searched premises).
The intrusion into seclusion cause of action may offer limited privacy protection because private areas may
be somewhat accessible to people who remain in public areas and use their natural or mechanically enhanced powers
of observation. 
15  See Shulman v. Group W  Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490-92  (Cal. 1998) ("T he tort [of intrusion]
is proven only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place ...."); see
also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P .2d 1269, 1280-81 & n.20 (Nev.
1995); Andrew Jay M cClurg, Bringing  Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for In trusions in
Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1036-41 (1995). See generally C. THOM AS D IENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING
AND THE LAW  §§ 12-2, 12-4(c)(2) (2d ed . 1997).
Thus, the location-focused quality of common-law intrusion claims makes extremely difficult successful
assertion of a privacy cause of action against extensive and intrusive monitoring that occurs in public places.  See
Bernard W. Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Operations, And Privacy, 11 WM . &
MARY B ILL RTS. J. 151, ___ n.72 (2002).
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Note that in the Court’s application of its location analysis, the location of the intruder,
not of his or her subject, is critical.  Thus, if the intruder is normally in a location considered
private, in terms of an ability to preclude unwanted guests from entering, that person nevertheless
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy if he or she is visible from a public location (i.e., a
location accessible to others or the general public).  For example, if a homeowner stands in front
of an open window visible from the street dressed only in underwear, he or she has no
expectation of privacy.
This approach has largely been adopted with regard to non-governmental intruders as
well, though the Supreme Court’s role in crafting legal doctrines in this context has been quite
modest.  The common law tort action for intrusion into seclusion reflects a narrow location based
approach.13  Thus, for instance, when journalists or private snoops breach private property, they
will generally be held to have invaded the property owner’s privacy.14  When, however, an
individual is either in a public place or  observable from one, courts have generally held that he
or she can assert no right of privacy.15  Indeed, even when the information is not gained by
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
16  Katz v. United States,  389  U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("W hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"). 
17  See,  Remsberg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816  A.2d  1001  149 N .H. 148  (2003) (holding that where a person 's
work address is readily observable by members of the public, the address cannot be private and no intrusion upon
seclusion action can be maintained, even if the intruder obtains the information from the plaintiff by deceit rather
than by observing her in public places).  See generally, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS  § 117, at 855 (5th ed.1984); Webb v. City of Shreveport, 371  So.2d 316, 319 (La. Ct. App.1979).  Note
that in interpreting the privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has treated
addresses as private, but largely because it would enable intrusions, in the form of mass mailings, by mass marketers
or labor organizers.  United States Department of Defense v. F .L.R.A., 510 U.S. 487 (1994); see, Wine Hobby USA,
Inc. v. United States I.R.S., 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
18   For example, while the United States Supreme Court held that the use of a beeper to track the
movements of a car did not violate reasonable expectations of privacy, because law enforcement officers could
lawfully follow the car to obtain the same information, the Washington Supreme Court prohibited the practice.  The
Court explained that even though it might theoretically possible to maintain such surveillance, the beeper (or, more
specifically, the GPS tracking device), served as substitute for such demanding and labor-intensive surveillance.  
State v. Jackson, 150 W ash.2d 251, 262, 76  P.3d 217 (2003).  
19  See O liver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 & n.15 (1984)(law enforcement officers may commit
the tort of trespass by entering privately-owned open fields without violating the landowner’s reasonable expectation
of privacy).
20  See, e.g., People v. Dezek, 308 N.W .2d 652, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)  (recognizing privacy interest in
rest stop stalls during periods of occupation); State v. Casconi, 766 P.2d 397, 399 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) ("'The final
bastion of privacy is to be found in the area of human procreation and excretion' and '[if] a person was entitled to any
shred of privacy, then it is to privacy in these matters."') (quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 607 P.2d 206 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)
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observation from a public place, the fact that it could be so garnered is sufficient for the
information to be considered “public.”  Note that the Supreme Court’s expectation of privacy
focuses on whether information is exposed to public view, not whether the information is gained
from public view.16  So, for example, one’s address is not private because it is exposed to the
public, even if a person discovers one’s address by some other means.17   A more privacy-
protective location approach might reject such an approach.18 
Location-based privacy approaches defining the scope of privacy need not exclusively
turn on real property interests.19  We may consider certain physical spaces as “private” ones in
which occupants have some “expectation of privacy” even though they lack any ownership
interest.  For example, use of hidden cameras in public bathroom stalls constitutes a search
requiring probable cause and a warrant (or the equivalent) because users of such facilities possess
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stall while they occupy it, despite their lack of any real
property claim to dominion over the stall.20
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
(decided under Oregon state constitution).
21  See generally Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 971-74 (1989) (discussing the role of the social construct of private space in shaping
intrusion law).
22  ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC  29-32 (1971).
23  See Dana Canedy, Tam pa Scans the Faces in Its Crowd for Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A1.
24  Ross Kerber, Technology & Innovation: Face-Recognition Software Spurs Privacy Fears,  BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 20 , 2001, at C1; Miki Meek, You Can't Hide Those Lying Eyes in Tampa: Street Cameras Spark a
Privacy Debate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug, 6, 2001 , at 20; Rick Montgomery, Face-Recognition Software
Getting a Hard Look Since Sept. 11, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 25 2001, at A1; Robert O'Harrow Jr., Matching
Faces With Mug Shots; Software for Police, Others Stirs Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at A1.
25  See text accompanying note 95 infra.
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Perhaps more controversially, we may have a small area around us that social custom
defines as ours, and that we may ask others to keep inviolate.21 Thus, by custom, we may view
people as intruding when they stand too close in certain situations.22  Perhaps such an insight
would provide a different perspective on certain privacy issues even under a location based
approach.
Under the standard property-based location approach, law enforcement officers'
surreptitious use of facial recognition technology on streets and in sports stadiums raises no
privacy interest, because anyone scanned in such a place is publicly visible.23  But that conclusion
seems counter-intuitive to many.  (The conclusion is not necessarily counter-intuitive because
such an intrusion should be considered unjustified, but only because the conventional analysis
suggests the absence of any “intrusion” that even demands justification.)  At least prior to
September 11, 2001, a chorus of criticism greeted the use of video monitors and facial
recognition technology to identify people on public streets.24
We might understand the opposition to such surveillance if we focus on the “means on
intrusion” paradigm (as I will suggest below).25  But a sophisticated “location” analysis might
also explain the problematic nature of such surveillance techniques — such techniques invade
individuals’ “space.”  A camera operator using zoom technology could focus on details
observable by the naked eye only if the observer were staring intently at a person from inches
away.   The camera operator might obtain information that could be gained only by breaching the
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
26  The same is true with regard to viewing a person in their front yard with binoculars, which under the
Court’s analysis surely violates no reasonable expectation of privacy, see U.S. v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927)(dicta);
On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952)(dicta); FISH MAN & M CKENNA, supra note 10, § 29:10; Christopher
Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN . L. REV. 1393 nn. 43-44 (2002), but which many see as much more intrusive
than some law enforcement actions the Court has recognized as violating a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society, 42 DUKE L.J.
727, 763 (1993)(chart).
A well-known case, Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970),
provides an example of judicial recognition of our intuition that individuals have a “private” space around them as
they navigate the world.  The case involved wide-ranging allegations that General Motors had harassed consumer
advocate Ralph Nader. Nader alleged that General Motors "hired people to shadow [him] and keep him under
surveillance." One of Nader’s complaints has particular relevance to the current discussion, namely his assertion that
his General M otors "shadow" followed him sufficiently closely to observe "the denomination of the bills he was
withdrawing from his account."  Id. at 771.  The court explained that 
    [a] person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by
being in a public place, and the mere fact that Nader was in a bank did not give
anyone the right to try to discover the amount of money he was withdrawing. On
the other hand, if plaintiff acted in such a way as to reveal [the] facts to any
casual observer, then, it may not be said  that the appellant intruded into his
private sphere.
Id.  Granted, the court phrased its analysis in terms of the subject matter to which intruders may direct their attention.
The passage above suggests that information regarding the amount a person withdraws from his bank account is a
private matter.  However, if the subject matter, withdrawal of money from a bank, were truly the crux of the court's
analysis, a casual observer who could see the denominations of the currency Nader was withdrawing because of
Nader's carelessness in failing to keep the currency from sight could neither stare at Nader to discover the
denominations of the currency Nader held nor communicate information about Nader's withdrawal of money (even
that gained from casual observation.  The Court probably did not intend to adopt such a position.  Rather, the Court
can be viewed as adopting a sophisticated location-based analysis.  The Court’s conclusion really embodies the
proposition that even in a public place we may have a small area around us that social custom defines as ours, and
that we may ask others to keep inviolate.  Such personal space enables individuals to access purses or wallets that
contain personal, private matters without revealing those matters to others.
27  While subject to dispute among scholars, many view “privacy” as encompassing not only control of
information about or access to persons but also  the ability to engage in conduct free from the constraint of others, a
type of “liberty” interest.  See Secrets & Lies n.21; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977)(“the cases
sometimes characterized as protecting privacy have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.  One is
the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions”).
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social recognized “space” individuals are entitled to as the move through public areas.26  
A location-driven analysis has also strongly influenced the courts’, and the legal system’s,
analysis of privacy rights conventionally considered autonomy rights.27  The legal system may
sometimes characterize conduct as public or private depending on the nature of the location in
which that conduct occurs.  Sometimes non-commercial conduct will more likely be considered
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
28  However, when the conduct a resident engages in at home becomes commercialized, courts often
consider the conduct to have been transformed from "private" to "public." See, e.g., State v. Mueller, 671 P.2d 1351,
1360 (1983) (holding that prostitution occurring within a private residence is not protected by Hawaii's constitutional
right of privacy). Compare  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975), with  Belgarde v. State, 543 P.2d 206
(Alaska 1975) (commercial sale of narcotics to another in home not protected by the Alaska right of privacy).  See
generally , United States v. Lewis, 385 U .S. 206,213 (1966) (explaining that undercover officers’ entry into homes,
by using deception to obtain the homeowner's consent to enter, did not violate the  homeowner's Fourth-Amendment-
protected expectation of privacy because the residence had become a locus of commerce)("But when, as here, the
home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful
business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the
street. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may
enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated  by the occupant.")..
29  394 U.S. 557 (1969).
30  Id. at 568.
31  Id. at 565. 
32  370 U.S. 660, 676- 77 (1962).
33  392 U.S. 514, 532-37 (1968).
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private, in the sense of being free from public control, simply because it takes place in certain
locations, most notably the home.28  Stanley v. Georgia29 provides the classic illustration.  In
Stanley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court precluded the government from enforcing laws
prohibiting possession of obscene material against a man who held such proscribed obscenity
within the confines of his home. The Court held that the government could generally prohibit
possession of obscene materials outside the home and could punish acquisition of such materials
— even if intended for use in the home — but could not prosecute the homeowner for possession
once he had brought the contraband inside his home.30  As the Court explained, "whatever may
be the justification for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the
privacy of one's own home."31  
As a second illustration of the relevance of location in defining spheres of autonomy,
consider two United States Supreme Court cases from the 1960's.  In Robinson v. California,32
the Court found unconstitutional a California statute criminalizing narcotics addiction. 
Admittedly, the Court did not establish a constitutional right to use narcotics at home.  The
decision turned on the Court’s conclusion that the Constitution precluded the state from
criminalizing a “status” rather than “conduct.”  However, in Powell v. Texas,33 the Court refused
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
34  But see, Bowers v. H ardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) ("Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is
not immunized whenever it occurs in the home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession or use of illegal drugs, do
not escape the law where they are committed at home."), overruled, Lawrence v. Texas, — U.S. —, 123 S.Ct. 2472,
2478 (2003) (holding that the right to privacy protects those who enter into homosexual relationships and engage in
sexual intimacies, noting particularly that the conduct for which the parties were prosecuted occurred in the home,
and that the statutory prohibition included sexual conduct “in the most private of places, the home”).. 
The controversial Alaska Supreme Court decision in Ravin v. S tate, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975),  provides
a more striking example of a judicial determination that o therwise illegal activity may become constitutionally
protected private conduct because it occurs within the home. In Ravin, the court held that, even though the state may
prohibit possession and the purchase and sale of marijuana in general, the government may not prosecute an
individual for consuming marijuana at home.  Id. at 511.  The court based its decision on the Alaska Constitution's
right of privacy clause, finding that the clause protected consumption of marijuana so long as it occurred in one's
home.  Id. at 504.
This principle that conduct more easily qualifies as private if it occurs within the home may explain the
reaction, hyperbolically described as "global ridicule," to a Friendship Heights, Maryland ordinance banning
smoking at home if secondary smoke escapes the home and poses health risks to those outside.  Jo Becker,  Global
Ridicule Extinguishes Montgomery's Anti-Smoking Bill, WASH . POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1; Jo Becker, Smokers
Told to Fetter Their Fumes , WASH . POST, Nov. 21, 2001, at A1. 
35  Indeed, sometimes a “location” is protected because of the information it is likely to contain, and thus,in
a sense subject-matter concerns drive the location analysis.  For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rejection
of the Supreme Court’s decision that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in opaque bags of garbage, was
based in part on the content of such bags, which often contain documents that say a lot about th individual who
discarded them.  State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, ___ (“[c]lues to people’s most private traits and affairs can be
found in their garbage”); accord, People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1104 (1969).
36  Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894  n.18 (1981);
Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604); W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4  COMM ENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 223 (1769).
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to extend Robinson to bar prosecution of a chronic alcoholic for public drunkenness.  It pointedly
noted that Texas had not “attempted to regulate appellant's behavior in the privacy of his own
home.”34
Even the Court’s location analysis does not focus merely on physical accessibility. 
Certain physical locations, like the home, receive special protection.35  The decision to accord
certain locations heightened protection often reflects a recognition that particular locations are
intimately associated with certain types of information or activities or with means of
communication (and thus reflect the influence of the subject matter and means of
communications paradigms in judicial consideration of a particular location’s status).
For instance, Anglo-Saxon tradition has long held the home as particularly sacrosanct,36
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
37 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (requiring a search warrant to support thermal
scanning of a home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) (asserting that being arrested in your home
is such a substantial invasion that a warrant is required, unless there are exigent circumstances); NELSON LASSON ,
THE H ISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION  13-15
(1970). See generally , LAFAVE ET AL., supra  note 20, § 3.2(c); Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man's Home is his Castle?:”
Reflections on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8
WM . &  MARY J. WOMEN &  L. 175, 175- 183  (2002).
38  533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
39  Granted the opinion may merely have been written in overly broad language, and the fact that thermal
imaging technology are not in general use may have been dispositive.  Perhaps the Court was merely holding that
behaving in a way that exposes information to users of  thermal imaging devices does not qualify as exposing those
activities “to the public” because thermal imging devices are not in general public use.
40  See note 47 supra , and accompanying text.
41   Thus nude scenes from a drive in movie theater are protected by the First Amendment.  Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v. California 403 U.S. 15 (1971)(First Amendment protected war
protester’s wearing a jacket saying “Fuck the Draft” in a courthouse, despite the fact that others were offended).
42  Thus, the Federal Communication Commission can regulate the broadcast of indecent speech because
broadcasts  “confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of his home, where the individual’s right
to be let alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment right of intruders.” FCC v.Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 736
(1978).  Similarly, states may ban targeted picketing of a particular residence.  Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, ___
(1988)(“An important aspect of such privacy is the protection of unwilling listeners within their homes from the
intrusion of objectionable or unwanted speech.”).  In Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the
Court upheld a Postal Service regulation permitting recipients of pandering advertisement to have the Postal Service
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and the Supreme Court has largely honored that tradition.37  Indeed recently, in Kyllo v. United
States,38 the Court suggested that a more robust location analysis might apply to the home.  In
holding that warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to identify a dwelling’s heat signature
(for purposes of determining whether the occupant was cultivating marijuana), the Court
recognized an expectation of privacy in an aspect of the home that could be detected from a
lawful vantage point.  Thus the key aspect of the case was the location of the conduct (the growth
of marijuana), not the intruder.39
Not only has the Court accorded residences special consideration in the Fourth
Amendment context, it has done so in the First Amendment context as well.  For example,
speakers ordinarily have a right to speak in public places even though their speech may disturb or
offend to others.40  Thus, in public, citizens must “avert their eyes” to avoid such disturbing or
offensive speech.41  However, when the speech enters the home, privacy interests ordinarily
prevail over the First Amendment interest of speakers.42  The home has also sometimes assumed
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
require the mailer to remove the addressee’s name from its mailing list.  The Court acknowledged that outside our
homes, we are often captives who must listen to objectionable speech, but that we need not be captives within our
homes.  Id. at ___.  See also M ainstram Marekting Services, Inc. v. FTC slip op. at 19-20 Dkt No. 03-1429  (10th
Cir. February 17, 2004)(upholding constitutionality of the national do not call registries).
43  See note ___ infra.
44  Thus, visitors to a commercial establishments' public areas and individuals invited onto premises for
commercial purposes qualify as "invitees" and have a right to expect landowners to exercise reasonable care.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  § 332 (1977). Social guests to residences, however, must take the premises as
they find them, and the host ordinarily must merely disclose dangerous conditions. Id. at § 342. Granted, several
jurisdictions have jettisoned the rigidity of this traditional approach. Nevertheless, landowners' freedom to act on
their own property despite the risk of injury to those who come onto their land is unusually pronounced when the
property is a private residence. Compare  id., with  id. at § 332. Generally, the duty to avoid  reasonably foreseeable
harm to others is much greater than the duty the  law imposes on landowners with regard to social visitors. Id. at §
342.
45  See Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 235-39, 237 n.4  (1986) (allowing aerial surveillance of
large industrial complex, but suggesting that the result would be different as to "an area immediately adjacent to a
private home, where privacy expectations are most heightened").
46  See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body ,  80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 389, 436
(2000)(“relational privacy” provides little shelter for “commercial transactions”).
Administrative searches, however, are  not invariably limited to businesses. See Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967); Frank v. State, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). (Border control searches often involve intrusions upon
individuals not engaged in commercial enterprises.)  Nevertheless, administrative searches of non-commercial
premises are rare.
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importance in the Court’s definition of the scope of decisional autonomy protected by the
constitutional “right to privacy,” as we have seen above.43  Indeed, more broadly, tort law has
long recognized the home as special and thus moderated the standard duties that would require
homeowners to make their residences safe for visitors.44   
By contrast, commercial premises are protected by a much less robust conception of
privacy.45 Indeed, the more modest expectations of privacy associated with commercial activity
may explain the more limited Fourth Amendment protection applicable in the regulatory
environment.46  However, even some commercial areas may receive special privacy protections,
in part perhaps because they serve as a locus for activities viewed as private under other privacy
paradigms — that is, they are the locus for confidential relationships (recognized under the
confidential relationships paradigm), a means of communication (recognized under the means of
communication paradigm), or certain “private” activities (as recognized under the subject matter
paradigm).
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
47  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988).  
48  While ord inarily “in public debate . . . citizens must tolerate insulting, even outrageous speech in order to
provide adequate breathing space for the freedoms protected by the First Amendment,” Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
322 (1988); Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)(citizens on street corners must, in the interest of fostering
“enlightened opinion,” tolerate speech that “tempt[s] [the  listener] to  throw [the speaker] off the street”), states, in
the exercise of their police powers, may take focus particularly “on access to health care facilities” and seek to
prevent the “potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests.”  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,
715 (2000); see Madsen v. Women’s Health Center Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994)(upholding noise restrictions
around abortion clinics because noise control is particularly important around medical facilities during surgery and
recovery periods).
One striking case in which such a perspective may have made a difference is Howell v. New York Post, 81
N.Y. 115 (1993).  In that case a photojournalist seeking to photograph Hedda Nussbaum on the grounds of a private
psychiatric hospital, the Four Winds Hospital, trespassed onto Four W inds’ grounds to photograph Nussbaum with a
telephoto lens.  Had New York recognized an “intrusion into seclusion” cause of action, plaintiff, a patient who
happened to be near Nussbaum when the photo was taken, might have prevailed.  Instead, the plaintiff had to seek to
make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Trespassing to take a photograph dep icting a private
person’s residence in a psychiatric facility might appear to qualify as “extreme and outrageous” conduct that would
provide a  basis for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.  However, the court used a location analysis
in assessing the severity of the privacy invasion.  The Court noted that mere trespass was not sufficiently outrageous
to give rise to such a cause of action, and that the fact that plaintiff was photographed outdoors and from a distance
weakened her claim.  Id. at 126. 
49  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000); see Madsen v. Women’s Health Center Inc., 512 U.S. 753,
772  (1994); Anita Allen, Privacy in Health Care , ENCY CLOPED IA OF B IOETHICS 2064-73 (1995)(“norms of quietude
surrounding hospitals reflects the sentiment that patients have heightened physical and psychological needs for
solitude and peace of mind”).
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Medical facilities may receive heightened privacy protections for such reasons,
particularly in the First Amendment context.  Ordinarily, people in public places “must tolerate
insulting, even outrageous speech in order to provide adequate breathing space for the freedoms
protected by the First Amendment.”47  The Supreme Court has said, however, that people in
medical facilities, as well as those who enter and leave such facilities are entitled to special
protections from the tumult produced by confrontational speech.48  Thus, states possess enhanced
powers to restrict protests near health care facilities, including facilities providing abortion
services, to reduce the “potential trauma to patients associated with confrontational protests.”49
Similarly, book stores and public libraries (or at least the records they maintain) are accorded
heightened protection as locations, because they reveal much about the information a person
receives.  As I shall suggest below, receipt of information in such a context is a form of
communication that, under the means of communication paradigm, may well warrant  significant
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
50  Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44  P.2d 1044 (2002); David Streitfeld & Ann G erhart, Privacy
Between the Covers: Stores Have their Defenders and Skeptics in their Bind Over Starr’s Subpoenas, WASH . POST
F01 (April 3, 1998); JEFFREY RO SEN, THE UNWANT ED G AZE: THE D ESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AM ERICA 4, 8-9, 20, 36, 61 ,167-68, 230  (2001)(critical of subpoena); see note 68 infra (concerns about
accessibility of public library records).  The protection of bookstore and library records might also be viewed as
reflecting the confidential relationship paradigm, in that the relationship between such institutions and patrons could
be considered a confidential relationship.
51  793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
52  Id. at ___.
53   Schmerber v. California, 384 U .S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that intrusion into human body is
particularly offensive and may only be undertaken upon "a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found");
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) ("A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence
implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if
likely to produce evidence of a crime."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that forcing a defendant
to vomit two capsules of morphine that he had swallowed was a search in violation of his right to due process); see
also Sherry F. Colb , The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness , 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642,
1649-50 (1998) (noting that courts have held that probable cause and warrants are not by themselves sufficient to
justify a surgical search).  See also , Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)(holding that a court
cannot compel a plaintiff in a civil action to submit to a surgical examination). 
54  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (“One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or
likeness of another is subject to liability to the o ther for invasion of his privacy”). 
55  See, Hodgson v. Minn, 497 U.S. 417, 462  (1990)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(abortion) (“usurps a young
woman's control over her own body ”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 915-16 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)(abortion); Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 261, ___ (1990)(right to die); Washington v. Glucksburg, 521
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privacy protection.50
Though I have tried to define location in terms of physical space that can be occupied, the
human body could be viewed as a “location” entitled to heightened protection.  As Justice Mosk
observed, albeit in dissent, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California,51 society’s
recognition of individual’s legally protectible interest in his or her own body constitutes society’s
acknowledgment of “a profound ethical imperative to respect the human body as a physical and
temporal expression of the unique human persona.”52 Thus, courts have been particularly
protective when government seek to effectuate a significant invasion of the human body.53  
Moreover, one common law privacy cause of action focuses specifically upon vindicating
people’s interest in preventing the public display of their physical likeness without their
consent.54  Even in the autonomy context, the right of privacy has been justified as essential to
allowing individuals to control their own bodies.55  Individual’s autonomy interests in their
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
U.S. 702, ___  (1997)(right to die).
56  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW  OF TORTS  § 28, at 54 (battery vindicates an individual’s right “to decide for
herself how her body will be treated by others”);  Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Alaska 1993) (quoting
Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398, 411 (La. 1988)) (“The informed consent doctrine is based on the
principle that every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done to his or
her own body.”); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)
(Cardozo, J.).
57  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508 (codified, ad amended, at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522); e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5702-5704; 5725 .  See generally , FISHMAN &  MCKENNA, supra  note 10, at §§
4.41-4.92 (discussing state wiretapping statutes).  Location-based privacy rules can partially protect the means of
communication, particularly if the communication involves face-to-face contact. However, technological advances
even erode location-based protections of face- to-face communications. More significantly, much of modern
communication does not take place in person, but rather by means of communication that rely upon channels open to
the general public. M ost mail goes through a federal instrumentality itself. Telephonic and electronic
communications are transmitted by common carriers.
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bodies has also historically been protected by common law causes of action for battery and
negligent failure to obtain informed consent.56 
In short, the legal system often conceptualizes privacy in terms of defining physical
locations as either “private” or “public.”  While this focus on the location paradigm can be
sensitive to the other privacy paradigms I discuss below, the Supreme Court’s failure in defining
“reasonable expectations of privacy” stems in part from its focus on the potential for sensory
access as the determinant of privacy expectations.
B.  The Means of Communication Paradigm
We may protect privacy by ensuring that individual’s ability to communicate with each
other are secure.  Because we must communicate confidences, if the means of communication are
not secure, we cannot effectively guard our privacy.  The federal and state wiretapping laws
embody this impulse to protect privacy by protecting the means of communication.57  Thus, in
explaining the rationale for the enactment of the first federal wiretapping statute, in 1968, the
Senate Judiciary Committee explained that technological developments in electronic surveillance
had seriously jeopardized the “privacy of communication”:  “Every spoken word relating to each
man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an
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58   S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154 (quoted
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542-43 (2001).  See  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 523 , 526; id. at 541-42 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting)(By conferring such protection, Congress sought to restore citizens' confidence in telephonic (and
other) communications by reestablishing the integrity of communications over telecommunications devices.).
59 Warren and Brandeis, viewed the essence of the right to privacy as the power to protect the expression of
thoughts, beliefs, and emotions in any form, whether communicated to another or merely written for one’s own
purposes.  Non-consensual publication of such thoughts, beliefs and emotions invaded privacy, even if the publisher
had obtained access to those thoughts, beliefs, and emotions by legal means.  Warren and Brandeis feared that
technological advances threatened to strip individuals of the ability to keep their beliefs, thoughts, and emotions
private— they complained that mechanical devices threatened to make good the prediction that “what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”
And indeed, W arren and Brandeis sought not merely to protect the content of “communications” to others,
but peripheral information related to the communication, such as the  identity of an individual’s correspondents.  
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)( “A man writes a letter
to a dozen people.  No person would be able to publish a list of the letters written.”) 
60  Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978).  Admittedly, he justified the
protection because of the “transactions costs” of doing otherwise, namely that communications would become more
formal and less informative even people assumed that others were always monitoring their conversations.  Posner, 12
GA. L. REV. at 401-03.
One could object to Posner’s whole effort, on the grounds that he essentially assumed away a fundamental
element of the privacy problem before beginning his analysis, merely because it was no t amenable to  economic
analysis.  Id. at 394.  (We could regard [“privacy” and “prying”] as pure consumption goods, the way turnips and
beer are normally regarded in economic analysis, and we would then speak of a “taste for privacy or for prying.  But
this would bring the economic analysis to a grinding halt because tastes are unanalyzable from an economic
standpoint.)
61  E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 , ___ (1971)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
62  Even before the American Revolution, the common law made eavesdropping actionable.  Blackstone
reported that the common law protected against eavesdropping, which he defined as “listening under walls or
windows, or the eaves of a house, to harken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous
-16-
unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage."58  Indeed, Warren and
Brandeis, in large measure conceived of privacy in terms of safeguarding the confidentiality of
communication.59  Even Richard Posner, who set forth a relatively limited view of privacy in his
controversial Georgia Law Review article, argued for protecting the means of communication
from intrusion.60  While the predominant focus on protecting the means of communication has
been intrusion from non-participants, some have argued that unconstrained recording of
conversations by participants also threatens the privacy of communications.61
Historically, the legal system, either through common law or by legislation, has sought to
protect the privacy of communications and considered third-party breaches of those
communications as privacy invasions.62  More recently, debate has raged with regard to “the
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
tales.  W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4  COMM ENTARIES ON THE LAW S OF ENGLAND 168 (1769).
The mail has likewise long been protected from breach.  During the colonial period, the mails were subject
to breach by postal clerks.  Benjamin Franklin, administrator of the colonial mail system, required clerks to take an
oath that they would not open the mails.  Subsequently, Congress enacted several statute protecting the security of
the mail. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRAN KLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CU R IO S IT Y F RO M  PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE
INTERNET  23-25, 49, 50, 56-57, 50-51 (2000); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877)(Court found a  privacy interest
in the contents of letters, but adopted more of a locational analysis in doing so).
Similar  controversy arose with regard to the security of communication by telegraph.  Smith, supra , at 69;
DAVID J. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN H ISTORY 30 (1978); Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880).
63  AMITAI ETZIONE, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 91-92 (1999); see also A. Michael Froomkin,
Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1484, 1487
(2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143
U. PENN. L. REV. 709(1995); Eben Moglen, So Much for Savages: Navajo 1, Government 0 in Final Moments of
Play, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 51 (1999); Maricela Segura, Is Carnivore Devouring Your Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 231 (2002).
64  The actual transfer of information from one person to another can be distinguished from the long-term
retention of the communication.  Indeed, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act affords much greater
protection to the act of communication than to the storage of communications.  Thus Title I of ECPA, which governs
interception of  communications while in progress, provides stronger privacy protection  than Title II of ECPA,
which governs access to stored communications.  Indeed, ECPA even gives greater protection to communications
that the recipient appears to be storing temporarily than those which the recipient stores indefinitely.  In particular,
Title II offers more protection for communications stored for 180 days or less than it does for those stored in excess
of 180 days. 
65  116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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privacy of communication” accomplished by means of Internet transmissions.  Encryption has
provided a technological means of protecting the privacy of communications, and in part the
debate has been over whether the government should have any power to breach the
confidentiality of such communications.63  In effect, then, some have argued that given the
characteristics of the Internet, communications over that medium should enjoy a heightened level
of privacy.  
More broadly, the means of communications can be conceptualized as including more
than conventional conversations.64  Thus, a person’s documentation of his or her own thoughts
might also warrant protection as a “means of communications,” allowing individuals to freely 
express themselves even when they do not seek to communicate with anyone else.  For a short
time in the late 1800's, Fifth Amendment doctrine reflected this approach.  In Boyd v. United
States,65 the Supreme Court treated the government-compelled production of documents as
analogous to compelling the writer’s oral testimony.  The Court opined that “any forcible and
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66  Id. at 630 (emphasis added).  W illiam Stuntz has persuasively argued that the Court could not maintain
that position without undermining the regulatory state.  W illiam J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of
Criminal Procedure , 93 MICH . L. REV. 1016, 1017-18, 1029-34 (1995).
Currently, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are not considered co-extensive, and regulators have far more
power to subpoena documents than to searches for them.  (Previously, in Federal  Trade Commission  v. American,
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), the Court had suggested that the Fourth Amendment limited the government’s
power to issue subpoenas, as well as its power to conduct searches.  Id. at 305-06.)  The contrasting approaches to
searches and subpoenas  might reflect an assessment based on the means of intrusion involved.  Perhaps subpoenas
cause less alarm than searches because subpoenas have a passive quality that searches lack. The citizens whose
papers are subpoenaed identify the relevant papers and produce them. Contrastingly, during searches, law
enforcement officers peruse large quantities of material, much of which may be irrelevant, to identify the material
relevant to the investigation. See Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. W alling, 327 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1946); PIERCE ET AL.,
supra  note 19, § 8.2, at 408-09 (3d ed. 1999).  The difference might also be explained by (or is at least consistent
with) the location mode of analysis.  A search would invariably require intrusion into a private location, a subpoena
does not.
67  For example, diaries may receive greater protection than other documentary records. See United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 619 n.2 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]he documents at stake here are business records
which implicate a lesser degree of concern for privacy interests than, for example, personal diaries."); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("D iaries and personal letters that record  only their
author's personal thoughts lie at the heart of our sense of privacy.") .  See generally , Senate Select Committee on
Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 22 (1994)(recognizing precedent according “personal papers such as diaries”
the “greatest respect” and the “broadest of constitutional protections” and noting “the peculiarly sensitive nature of
personal diaries,” yet ordering Senator to turn over diaries pursuant to Senate investigation of sexual harassment
charges).  Granted this distinction can also be justified by a subject-matter or location analysis (ordinarily, diaries
would not be voluntarily exposed to another).
68  See, e.g., Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.2d 1044 (2002).  Public library records, which
record the materials borrowed, and thus presumably read, might also be given heightened protection. E.g., Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 11-25 (West 1986); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:73-43.2 (West 1989); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4509 (McKinney
1989); see also Ulrika Ault, The FBI's Library Awareness Program : Is Big Bro ther Reading Over Your Shoulder? ,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532 (1990).  This concern about records documenting individual’s reading matter may also
explain the privacy concerns raised about the use of Internet “cookies.”  
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compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of a crime” invades the indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and
private property, and thus, in a sense, “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
other.”66  While the Court has jettisoned Boyd, some forms of self-expression that individuals do
not intend to reveal to others, like diaries, may be considered particularly private.67
The means of communications might also be conceptualized to include individuals’
reading of the works of others.  Thus persons may receive another’s thoughts by purchasing their
works from a bookstore or borrowing them from the library.   The legal system has been
particularly protective of records of public library borrowing and book purchases.68
The Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile the predominant location paradigm with
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
69  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Thus, for example, the government does not breach any
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus does not conduct a search or seizure, if it convinces the telephone
company to install a pen register on a subscriber's line. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U .S. 735 (1979).
70  277 U.S. 438 (1928).
71  Id. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
72  Id.
73  Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Indeed, Brandeis is particularly partial to a means-of-communication
analysis, since he is so intent on treating as private, and thus according protection to, thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions.  Thus, for example, in the article he co-authored with Samuel Warren, many of the examples focus on
expressions of thought, sentiments, and emotions, either to oneself or to a select group of others.  Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) ("The common law secures to each
individual the right of determining ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others"); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(The
makers of our Constitution ... recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”)
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the means of communications paradigm.  The Fourth Amendment’s applicability to wiretapping
has been the seminal question that has forced the Court to confront the conflict between the two.
The court's location-focused analysis lies at the root of its historically inadequate analysis of
wiretapping. If analyzed employing a location-focused perspective, wiretapping may not
constitute a “search or seizure” if the wiretapper merely breaches the telephone company's
property.69  This approach lay at the root of the Court’s initial decision with regard to
wiretapping, United States v. Olmstead,70 finding that wiretapping did not constitute a “search”
and thus was not subject to the Fourth Amendment’s strictures.  While the Olmstead majority
relied on a classic location analysis, Brandeis’s noted dissent focused on wiretapping’s threat to a
means of communication.  In particular, Brandeis argued that telephone calls should receive no
less protection than sealed letters, which the Court had already declared protected from breach by
the Fourth Amendment.71  Indeed, he argued that wiretapping was the more egregious privacy
invasion — it revealed the speech of not just one person (as in the case of a sealed letter), but that
of numerous persons who might communicate with the investigative target by telephone.72  To
him, the location of the physical connection to the wires leading to the defendant’s home was
immaterial.73
The Court ultimately revisited the issue forty years later in Katz v. United States.  In Katz,
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74  LAFAVE ET AL., supra  note __, § 3.2(a), at 133; RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN,
PRIVACY LAW : CASES AND MATERIALS 94-95 (2d ed. 2002).
75  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967).  Admittedly, the second question focused on whether
the existence of a trespass was of critical Fourth Amendment importance.
76  Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; see United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)(discussing Katz’s significance).
77  Another example of a dramatically different conclusions the location and means of communications
paradigm can produce involves the law enforcement technique know as the “mail cover.”  In a "mail cover," postal
employees record the information on the outside of envelopes mailed by a particular patron. A location analysis
would suggest that, at least with respect to the postal service, a mail cover does not breach any reasonable
expectation of privacy: the patron has certainly voluntarily exposed the address of the letter to view.  A means of
communication approach may well suggest that such a privacy interest exists, a person should  be ab le to
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the government had monitored a conversation the defendant made from a telephone booth, by
placing a recording device on the outside of the booth.  Had the Court employed its traditional
location-focused analysis, it would have rejected Katz's Fourth Amendment claim because the
telephone booth from which Katz placed his call was not a protected location under traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis.  A law enforcement officer, or anyone else, could view Katz
through the glass of the phone booth, and any person could have attached an item to the side of
the telephone booth.  Until Katz, the Court had focused on delineating constitutionally protected
areas.74  Indeed, Katz’ attorney formulated the question before the Court as “whether a public
telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area . . .?”75 (Granted, the Court could have
designated telephone booths as constitutionally protected places because of the nature of the
activity that customarily occurs therein — namely personal telephone conversations that the
speaker expects to remain private.)
But the breakthrough that made Katz a seminal case was the Court's focus on the means
of communication — in particular, whether telephone communications deserved protection,
rather than on the location of the participant engaged in the phone conversation (or the location
of the third-party intruder).  As the Court explained: “To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”76 
Though the phone booth Katz had used was not itself a constitutionally protected place, Katz
could assert a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his conversation because the
conversation had taken place over the telephone.77  The Court dramatically asserted its extrication
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communicate with others without third parties systematically identifying each person with whom he communicates. 
Indeed, W arren and B randeis themselves expressed exactly such a concern.    Warren & Brandeis, supra  note __, at
___  ( “A man writes a letter to a dozen people.  No person would be able to publish a list of the letters written.”).
The courts seem to take a location approach to mail covers when analyzing the constitutionality of mail
covers. Shirley M. Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental Information
Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1510-11 (1979) (quoting United States ex  rel. Milwaukee Social Dem ocratic
Publ'g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921))(Lower courts have rarely perceived that any interest protected by
the fourth amendment is implicated by mail covers. In part, this is due to recurring attacks of Olmsteadism: no
trespass is involved, no search or seizure occurs when the eye registers the impressions from the outside of an
envelope or the hand records the information .... Equally rare is recognition that "the mails [are] almost as much a
part of free speech as the right to  use our tongues ....") ; see also , Sandy D. Hellums, Note, Bits and Bytes: The
Carnivore Initiative and the Search and Seizure of Electronic Mail, 10 WM. & M ARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 837-39
(2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's upholding of mail covers as constitutional in United States v. Jacobson, 466
U.S. 109 (1983)) Postal regulations, however, take a means of communications approach, recognizing that “mail
covers” violate a legitimate privacy interest and therefore must be justified by a belief that the mail cover will either
provide evidence of a  serious crime or lead  to the apprehension of a fugitive. See 39 C.F.R. §  233 .3 (2002). 
A similar divergence in the paradigms is evident in the protections accorded  communications attributes. 
Communications attributes are peripheral information about a communication, such as the original and destination of
the communication and the duration of the communication.  The Court found communications attributes unprotected
because subscribers willingly exposed such information to telephone companies.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979).  Indeed, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act reflects this kind of locational bias — affording greater
protection to the “contents” of communications that to communications attributes.  However, the distinction could
also be explained by the relative sensitivity of the two types of  information.  Moreover, ECPA certainly pro tects
both communications attributes and the contents of communications.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703©)(2).
78  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 .  However, so pronounced is the Court’s focus on location, that the Court has felt
compelled to repeatedly reiterate this appellation.
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of itself from exclusive reliance on the location paradigm in one of the most quoted phrases of
the opinion: the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”78
As we shall see later in this paper, the means of communications paradigm differs from
the subject matter paradigm in ways that have significance for the focus of this paper, the Court’s
decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper with regard to the use of information a third-party gained by the
use of an illegal wiretap.  In effect, Bartnicki engrafts a subject-matter based definition of privacy
onto the paradigmatic statute that defines privacy in terms of the means of communications.   In
particular, the Court holds that participants in a conversation may not ensure that a conversation
remains private, by precluding public disclosure of the contents of the conversation made
possible only by illegal wiretapping, despite the fact that the conversation takes place over the
telephone.  The conversation must satisfy a second test focused on the subject matter of the
conversation, namely the conversation must be one that does not relate to a matter of public
importance.  
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79  Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525  ("If the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a public
arena -- during a bargaining session, for example -- they would have been newsworthy. That would also  be true if a
third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki making the same statements to Kane when the two thought they
were alone.").
80  ECPA, and its judicial construction, also at times reflects the influence of two competing paradigms, the
paradigms of location and confidential relationships also have a factor in considering the sanctity of telephone
communication.  The judicially-created a domestic exception to the wiretap laws provides an excellent example of
the influence of both competing paradigms.  Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 897
(1974)(one spouse recording another’s conversation from marital home) ; Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677,
679 (2d Cir. 1977) (parent monitoring child’s telephone call in their residence); Newcomb v. Ingle, 944 F.2d 1534
(10th Cir. 1991)(same); Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary
Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 901 (1967)(testimony of Herman Schwartz)  ("Now, we can see in certain
circumstances where  [allowing a person to  monitor a call on an extension] makes some sense. I take  it nobody wants
to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter . . .") . 
Similarly, under ECPA ownership of a location, namely the computer system that stores and transmits
messages, gives the employer a legal right to monitor its employees’ e-mail.
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Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court's opinion in Bartnicki is the Court's
comment that the disc jockey (who received a copy of the illegally recorded conversation) could
publish the information derived from the illegal interception of a wire communication because
the statements made in the course of the private call would have been newsworthy had they been
made in a public setting.79  In effect, the majority treated the means of communication, namely a
private phone conversation rather than a public statement, as irrelevant to the speakers' legitimate
expectation of privacy. The Court did so even though the wiretap laws it was addressing
specifically focuses privacy protection on the means of communication (not subject matter
considerations).80
In sum, a second important means of guarding privacy involves protecting the means of
communications, and both the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and various
statutes and regulations have consistently focused on ensuring that communications are not
breached except for substantial cause.
C.  The Means of Intrusion Paradigm
Sometimes we can seek to protect privacy by forbidding particular means of intrusion that
are especially destructive of privacy.  On the most basic level, the Fourth Amendment, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, embodies a special concern about “general
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81  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980);  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467 (1971); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 1494-1508 (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with the University of Michigan Dissertation
Information Service).
82  The precision of  dog sniff searches of luggage in uncovering only contraband was one of the reasons the
Supreme Court upheld such searches against constitutional attack.  U.S. v. Jacobson, 466 U .S. 109, 123-24 (1984). 
In this regard, the argument of the Kyllo majority in finding warrantless use of thermal imaging devices
unconstitutional is illuminating.  In part, the majority based its determination on a fear that advances in thermal
imaging technology would allow users of such devices to uncover legal activity inside the home (such as when
occupants of the dwelling took showers), Kyllo , even though, as currently used by law enforcement thermal imaging
devices generally reveal no more than probative evidence of illegal activity — they merely indicate the presence of
lights so intense that they could only be used in growing marijuana.
The minimization requirements of federal wiretap statutes are also intended to restrict intercep tions to
relevant material.  18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); see generally, Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1992)(finding
indiscriminate monitoring of employee conversation as not in the “ordinary course of business” and thus
impermissible under ECPA); FISHMAN &  MCKENNA, supra  note __, at §§ ____.
83    449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
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searches.”81  A “general search” is an unfocused search, not directed toward discovering any
particular item, conducted to uncover possible criminality.   Such searches reveal many irrelevant
matters, even if they also reveal relevant ones.82  The entitlement to privacy captured by the
prohibition on the “general search” focuses on the technique used to intrude, rather than the
location of the intruder, the subject of the intruder’s attention, or the existence of a
communication or confidential relationship (the focuses of the other four privacy paradigms). 
Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,83 a classic torts case, provides another illustration of the
principle that privacy may be defined in terms of the means of intrusion.  The case arose out of
journalists’ attempts to investigate Dietemann, a homeowner who offered clay, mineral and
herbal remedies for various medical maladies.  Journalists entered Dietemann’s home under false
pretenses, alleging that they sought treatment from Dietemann at a friend’s recommendation. 
While in Dietemann’s home, they used hidden audio and video recording equipment to document
their interaction with Dietemann.  Dietemann asserted a common law cause of action for
“intrusion into seclusion” against the journalists.  The Court found that the journalists had
wrongfully invaded Dietemann's privacy, but not because the reporters' had entered Dietemann's
home under false pretenses or proven themselves unfaithful confidants (i.e., false friends), who
had willingly disclosed the observations made while in Dietemann’s home.  The Court concluded
that members of society must accept such a risk.  But the Court distinguished the risk of being
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84  White v. United States, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).  Perhaps
one of the Supreme Court’s most serious failings defining reasonable expectations of privacy is its failure to
recognize that the use of undercover techniques can breach reasonable expectations of privacy. United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that evidence obtained through a government informant and the  use of a radio
transmitter did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (upholding the
validity of evidence obtained through use of a paid government informant); Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (holding that evidence obtained by an undercover agent with a concealed radio transmitter was valid and not
obtained by trespass); see also , Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); see generally, Slobogin &
Schumacher, supra  note 26, at ___ (survey showing that many regard the use of undercover techniques as more
intrusive than techniques that the Court has classified as searches because they breach reasonable expectations of
privacy).  Granted, in some instances, the Court has limited the use of undercover techniques.  Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 549, 554-56 (1977).
85  State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881 (Alaska 1978); State v. Hayes, 752 A.2d 16 (Vt. 2000); State v. Blow,
602 A.2d  556 (Vt. 1991).
86  Note that the United States Supreme Court’s approach treats deception and coercion differently, and, by
doing so, undermines the dominant location paradigm.  The entry into a protected area, such as a home, by
deceitfully obtaining the occupant’s consent does not, in the Court’s view, violate any legitimate expectation of
privacy.  United States v. Lewis, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).  State courts have disagreed with this approach, at least with
respect to the intruders using recording or transmitting devices.  Some state courts have demanded that law
enforcement officers make some showing justifying their intrusion before undercover operatives carrying recording
equipment enter residences.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 507 N.E.2d 1029 (1987);
Commonwealth v. Pratt, 407 Mass. 647, 555 N.E.2d 559 (1990); Commonwealth v. Brion, 539 Pa. 256, 652 A.2d
287 (1994); Commonwealth v. Rekasie, 566 Pa. 85, 778 A.2d 624 (2001).
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electronically recorded within one's home from the risk posed by tattling "false friends," and
concluded that members of society should not be expected to assume such a risk. 
While the United States Supreme Court has, in applying the Fourth Amendment,
concluded that undercover agent’s use of electronic equipment to record conversations with an
investigative target infringes upon privacy no more than an undercover agent’s repetition of that
conversation unaided by recording devices,84 several state courts have disagreed.85  Thus, even in
the criminal context, some courts have noted that use of electronic equipment raises privacy
questions even when repeating a conversation does not.86
Computerization provides a third example of type of privacy breach that can perhaps best
be defined in terms of the means of intrusion.  Our intuitions may well suggest that
computerization of records constitutes an independent intrusion upon privacy.  Thus, while
“public” court records may intrude upon privacy by making certain “private matters” accessible,
that privacy invasion is magnified when those court records are made available in computerized
form.  With the advent of the computerization of court records, state and federal courts have had
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87 In re Committee on Privacy and Court Records (Amended Administrative Order dated Feb . 12, 2004);
Policy Statement of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court Concerning Publication of Court Case Information on
the W eb (M ay 2003); Gary Blankenship, Supreme Court Restricts Online Access to Information, FLA BAR NEWS 1
(Dec. 15, 2003);  Kate Marquess, Open Court?: As Courthouses Rush to Put Filing Online, Easy Access to Legal
Documents Has Many Worrying About Privacy Rights, A.B.A.J., Apr. 2002, at 54; see also JUDICIAL
CON FERENCE COM M. ON CO URT  ADM IN. & CASE M GM T. REPORT ON PRIVACY AND PU BLIC
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES (2001), available at http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/Policy.htm;
MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & JUSTICE MGMT.
INST., DEVELOPING  CCJ/COSCA GUID ELINES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS T O COURT RECORDS: A
NATIONAL PROJECT T O ASSIST STATE COURTS (2002), available at, http:// www.courtaccess.org/
modelpolicy/18O ct2002FinalReport.pdf. 
88  AMITAI ETZIONE, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 142-43 (1999).
89  Yochai Benkler , How (If at All( to Regulate the Internet: Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking
Forward , 71 COLO L. REV. 1023, ____ (2000).
90   U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762 (1989)
91   Computer Matching and P rivacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552a(o) (2000)). 
92  429 U.S. 589 (1977).
93  The State argued that the new law was no more intrusive than the existing requirement that pharmacists
keep the same information available for inspection by state officials.  The trial court rejected the argument,
explaining: “The intrusion here is not only more immediate, its impact is greater. A name on a prescription in the
files of one of many thousands of pharmacists in the state of New York is entirely different from one's name on a
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to revisit privacy issues.  They have considered differentiating between computerized access to
court records and access to physical court records themselves, as well as placing new limits on
the material contained in court records.87  Amatai Etzione has discussed the implications of
computerization of medical records for medical privacy.88  Professor Yochai Benkler has made a
similar point with regard to records of consumer transactions.89
Computerization of records removes the “practical obscurity”90 of records that are
“available” but difficult to acquire and compile.   Federal law has recognized this concern, at
least with regard to the use of computer matching.  Congress has imposed special restrictions on
federal agencies' use of computer matching.91
The Supreme Court discussed the constitutional significance of the computerization of
government records in Whalen v. Roe.92  Citizens who took prescription drugs challenged New
York’s requirement that physicians report on the pharmaceuticals they had prescribed for patients
and the State’s computerization of those reports,93 asserting that the State had thereby  violated
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form in Albany which is transferred to computerized records and stored for instant retrieval.”  Doe v. Ingraham, 403
F. Supp. 931, 938  (1975).
94  Id. at 606-07.
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patients’ Due Process Clause’s right to privacy.  While the majority specifically expressed
concern about the privacy implications of “the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks and other massive government files,” it largely found the
problems to be resolved by the stringent state restrictions on access to the computerized records. 
Justice Brennan, in a separate concurrence, focused squarely on computerization as peculiarly
invasive practice.  He explained:
What is more troubling about this scheme, however, is the central
computer storage of the data thus collected. Obviously, as the State
argues, collection and storage of data by the State that is in itself
legitimate is not rendered unconstitutional simply because new
technology makes the State's operations more efficient. However,
as the example of the Fourth Amendment shows the Constitution
puts limits not only on the type of information the State may
gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The central
storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase
the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to
say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of
some curb on such technology.94  
Perhaps the source of at least some commentators’ disagreement with the Supreme
Court’s conception of the expectation of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, is a dispute
over the appropriate paradigms that should be employed to delineate legitimate private interests. 
While the Court’s account of privacy focuses largely on location (and perhaps to some extent the
means of communication), many commentators’ accounts of privacy make the means of intrusion 
significant as well.  For example, Alan Westin views an important aspect of privacy as the right
to anonymity.   Jeffrey Rosen (relying upon the work of Erving Goffman and others) focuses on
“civil inattention” as an important aspect of privacy.  Neither of these approaches assume that
only location matters in defining legitimate expectations of privacy.  Indeed , both argue that one
can have a legitimate expectation of privacy even when one is accessible to others.  The Westin
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95  JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANT ED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
16-18 (2001) (discussing "civil inattention" —  an expectation of a zone of privacy among strangers).
96  Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 COLUM . L.
REV. 1003, 1006-09 (1966); ALAN WES TIN , PRIVACY AND FR EE DO M  (1967).
97  Cite needed.
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and Rosen approaches might provide a different perspective on cases that courts have resolved
(or will probably resolve) by applying a location-based analysis.
For example, reconsider the aerial surveillance cases discussed earlier.  The Court has
held that because aircraft operate in public space — namely the airways controlled by the Federal
Aviation Administration (the "FAA") — and because any passenger may freely observe an
enclosed backyard as he travels past it, law enforcement officers may photograph enclosed
backyards (using detail-enlarging enhancements if necessary) or hover over such yards for
extended periods, examining their contents or any activities occurring therein.  But we might
well conclude, as Professor Jeffrey Rosen has recently suggested, that an invasion of privacy may
sometimes consist merely of focusing undue attention upon others.95  Such an insight suggests
that the conduct of an airplane passenger or law enforcement officer who happens to observe
incriminating activity as she goes about her business is distinguishable from that of the law
enforcement officer, journalist, or private citizen who hovers over the same yard and
concentrates on the activity occurring therein.  The former do not pay undue attention to the yard;
the latter violate the rules of “civil inattention.”  However, recognizing the distinction is possible
only if we view privacy as not turning exclusively on physical location, but, in addition,
occasionally turning on the potential means of intrusion. 
Alan Westin’s focus on anonymity suggests that there is a privacy intrusion to use of
cameras in public places, with or without the concomitant use of facial recognition technology.96 
Westin asserts that one of four important states of privacy is anonymity.  Often even when an
individual is in a “public” place and can be observed by others, the individual does not expect to
be “identified and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were known
to those observing him.”97  The knowledge, or even apprehension, that one is under systematic
observation in public places “destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open
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98  Cite needed. (Westin relates this proposition to Simmel’s phenomology of the stranger.)  Posner makes
this same observation, but ascribes it to a  cynical desire to manipulate others.  Posner, supra note ___, at ___.
99  State courts have found such a privacy interest in cases involving “rough shadowing,” cases in which a
person not only constantly follows another in public places, but does so in such a conspicuous manner as to ensure 
the target’s constant awareness of the surveillance.  See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 & n.11, 995 (2d
Cir. 1973) (implied right of action under criminal law of harassment); Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v.
Stevens, 132 S.E .2d 119, 122-23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963) (tort action); Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & P late
Glass Ins. Co., 139 N.W. 386, 389-90 (W is. 1913) (finding "rough shadowing" to be defamatory); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B  cmt. d (1977) (tortious intrusion into seclusion may arise from a “course of hounding”
another).
100  Another means of intrusion theory might explain the discomfort of many with face scans or general
surreptitious video surveillance in public street.  One troubling aspect of such techniques is the asymmetry in
positions of the  various actors involved. The watched, i.e., citizens using the streets, cannot observe the watcher. If
an actual person is doing the watching, individuals using a public place may at least determine when the watcher has
focused upon them. In addition, the watcher runs the risk that the object of his interest may subject him to the same
treatment. Finally, individuals being watched by an actual person may confront the watcher and seek an explanation
for his conduct; if such a confrontation occurs in a sufficiently public place, the subject of observation might even
successfully enlist the help of bystanders.  A concern for symmetry between actors might also provide a partial
explanation of our intuition that listening to another during a conversation with intent to repeat the conversation is
less troubling than recording that conversation.  See Bernard W . Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White Collar Crime,
Undercover Investigations, and Privacy, 11 WM  &  MARY B ILL RIGHTS L. REV. 151 , 184 (2002).  See generally ,
Jeremy Friedman, Prying Eyes in the  Sky: Visual Aerial Surveillance of Private Residences in Tort, 4 COLUM . SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 1, ___ & nn. 22-24 (2002-2003)(identifying the privacy invasion that results from aerial surveillance
as the asymmetry of information between observe and subject).
101  400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
102  See note ___ supra .
-28-
spaced and public arenas.”98   Such practices rob us of our ability to blend into the crowd and
frustrate a privacy interest Westin identifies.99  The location-based analysis sees such constant
surveillance as raising no privacy issue.100 
The Supreme Court has, at times, relied on a means of intrusion analysis to find no
invasion of privacy where one might ordinarily have been found.  Wyman v. James deserves
particular note as an example of this proposition.101  In Wyman v. James, the Court confronted a
Fourth Amendment challenge to social service agency caseworkers' inspections of the homes
families receiving financial assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
("AFDC") program.  The home, as a location, receives paramount privacy protection, and
citizens generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their dwellings.102  And indeed, the
dissenter emphasized the location paradigm in asserting that the aid recipients’ right to privacy
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103  Id. at 327-38, 332-33, 334-35 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 338-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice
Douglas opined: “Isolation is not a constitutional guarantee; but the sanctity of the sanctuary of the home is such--as
marked and defined by the Fourth Amendment. . . . What we do today is to depreciate it.” Id. at ___.
104  The special needs exception allows the government to conduct a search without warrant and probable
cause when the “special needs” of a non-law-enforcement program outweigh the privacy rights of individuals.  See,
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, ___ (2001)(prohibiting hospitals requirement that pregnant women on
public assistance provide urine samples for testing because the program was in conjunction with a law enforcement
initiative, but suggesting that the result would have been different had there been no law enforcement involvement);
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-653 (1995).; O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987)
(plurality opinion); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).  The term "special needs"  apparently first
appeared in Justice Blackmun's opinion concurring in the judgment in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
351(1985).  Cite needed.
105  Id. at 317-18, 321-22. 
106  Id. at 320-21 ("The means employed by [the state agency] are significant."). 
107  Id. at 319-21.
108  Id.
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precluded such inspections without the issuance of a warrant and probable cause.103  The Court
found, nevertheless, that state officials, in making home inspections, had breached no expectation
of privacy of the aid recipients. 
Had later doctrinal developments been available to the Court, it might have held that such
visits breached an expectation of privacy, but qualified as non-law-enforcement “special
purpose” searches that state officials could conduct without probable cause or a warrant.104  The
Court also sought to uphold the visiting program on the ground that aid recipients consented to
the search by accepting benefits,105 and some have focused on this aspect of the holding.  But the
Court provided a further and more detailed justification for its holding.  In doing so it not only
argued that the conditions in the recipient's home became a matter of public concern once she
began receiving aid under the AFDC program (which I will discuss later in considering the
subject-matter paradigm), but also explicitly focused on the means of intrusion used,106
characterizing them as “gentle.”107  The Court noted that social workers had engaged in no
snooping, provided the recipient advanced written notice of the inspection, and used no
deception in conducting the home inspection.108
Similarly, in Whalen v. Roe the means of intrusion proved critical.  As noted above, the
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109  Cite needed.  See Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d
1335, ___ (3d Cir. 1975)(distinguishing Laird v. Tatum because material obtained from government surveillance of
dissident groups was held without lack of safeguards for further dissemination and in fact were d isseminated to
others); Alliance to End Repression v. Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1985)(distinguishing Laird v. Tatum
and finding a cause of action for disseminating governmental surveillance information).
110  Granted, because of the subject matter of the information as well as the existence of a confidential
relationship (between patient and doctor), the Court recognized a privacy interest in the information even though the
patient “voluntarily” shared the information with others, such as insurance companies.  In the ordinary case, the
sharing of the information with others, even in circumstance in which the person has no real choice to  do o therwise, 
might defeat any assertion of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” altogether.  Even so, the privacy protective
means of intrusion was sufficient to override the Court’s analysis under the subject-matter and confidential
relationship paradigms.  (Note that the District Court Judge had  found the program unconstitutional precisely
because it breached a confidential relationship — the doctor-patient relationship, Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931,
936-37 (1975), and because of the sensitive nature of the sub ject matter of the  disclosures, id. at 937).
111  William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH . L. REV. 1016,
1041-42 (1995).  He notes, correctly, that prohibitions of further disclosure do not completely obviate privacy
concerns, and also that the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment does not reflect such an approach and
would indeed have to be drastically re-oriented in order to do so.
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case involved a challenged to creation of a centralized computer database containing certain
information about every prescription for a pharmaceutical written in New York State, including
the drug and dosage as well as the name, address, and age of the patient.  In part, plaintiffs
challenged the statutory scheme based on a concern about the potential disclosure of the data to
the general public.  The court found maintenance of the database permissible in large part
because of the strict controls on the dissemination of the information gathered.109  Thus, the
Court, and the plaintiffs, focused on the means of intrusion, considering collection of information
by itself less intrusive than collection and dissemination of information.110
The Whalen v. Roe Court’s approach is consistent with that of several noted scholars. 
Many have suggested that the prospect of dissemination should be considered in judging an
intrusion, and that “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment should include consideration
of the potential dissemination of information.  For example, William Stuntz notes that the degree
of intrusion might reasonably be said to differ “depending on whether the information is
subsequently spread.”111  Harold Krent has propounded the thesis that “the reasonableness of a
seizure extends to the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information
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Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law,  140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1991); Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy
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enforcement is much less likely to disseminate information lacking relevance to a criminal prosecution.  After all,
journalists’ primary mission is disseminating information to the public.  Indeed, the press is often accused of
disseminating information more to titillate than inform.  See, id. at 786 n. 180.  (I am skeptical about whether this can
serve as a compete or even significant justification of the d ifference attitudes toward law enforcement and  media
intrusions, because such an approach is at least in tension with the First Amendment.  Id. at 793.)  The Freedom of
Information Act and its various state analogues may reduce the significance of this distinction because much data,
once collected, can be obtained by the media (or any other member of the general public) by means of a Freedom of
Information Act request.
114  In the criminal investigation context one of the strongest forms of protection is the Federal Rules
provision regarding the secrecy of grand jury materials.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIM INAL PROCEDURE § 8.12(b) (3d ed. 2000)§ 8.3(f), § 8.5 ("[P]ublic disclosure of the investigation may cause
irreparable harm to his reputation even though the investigation eventually reveals no basis for prosecution.").
See also Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3412.
115 Id. at 532; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
116  Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 532 (quoting Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn).
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even after a lawful seizure,” including the dissemination of information gained from a search.112 
Indeed, such an approach might justify the courts’ tendency to treat warrantless law enforcement
intrusions more favorably than media intrusions.113   And indeed, statutes frequently couple
authorization to obtain or compel disclosure of information with an obligation to keep the
information derived from the use of such powers confidential.114
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court has relied upon a means of intrusion analysis rather than a
subject matter analysis in addressing the scope of privacy when privacy is threatened by the
publication of information.  The Court has been reluctant to hold that the publication of truthful
information can never give rise to a valid cause of action for invasion of privacy.115  As the Court
explained in Florida Start v. B.J.F., “press freedom and privacy rights are both ‘plainly rooted in
the traditions and significant concerns of our society.’”116   While the Court has said that
journalists must be free to publish “matters of public importance,” the Court has largely
succeeded in leaving undefined the“matters of public importance” that journalists may publish
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117  It is clear that this means of intrusion approach works in conjunction with other approaches, such as
property laws reflecting a locational approach to privacy, and wiretapping laws, reflecting a means of
communication protection of privacy, as well as laws enforcing confidentiality obligations, reflecting a confidential
relations approach to protecting privacy.  Thus, for instance, in B.J.F. the Court observed “To the extent sensitive
information rests in private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual
acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail princip le [i.e., that the press may publish any information it
obtains] the publication of any information so acquired.”  Id. at 534.  
118  Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-96 (1975)(involving  broadcasting of a
rape-murder victim’s identity that the broadcaster had obtained from courthouse records); Oklahoma Publishing  Co.
v. Oklahoma County  District Court, 430 U.S. 308, ___ (1977)(involving publication of the name or photograph of
the  11-year-old  subject of a juvenile proceeding which reporters had attended); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97, ___ (1979)(involving attempted publication of name of juvenile defender whose identity journalists had
determined by from witnesses, the police, and a local prosecutor); Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 596
(1976).
119  Id. at 534-35, 538 (“where the government itself provides information to the media, it is most
appropriate to assume that the government had, but failed to utilize, far more limited means of guarding against
dissemination than the extreme step of punishing truthful speech.”).
120  491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
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despite the resultant harm to an individual’s privacy.  Rather, the Court has resorted to the means
of intrusion paradigm to craft the constitutional doctrine protecting privacy:117 a matter is
“public” rather than “private” if a journalist obtains the information from a public official,
without engaging in illegal activity to do so.  Thus, in several cases the Court established the
principle that the First Amendment protects a journalist’s publication of information the
government has divulged.118  The government may protect various interests, including the interest
in privacy, by ensuring that it does not divulge the information to the journalist.119  One of the
Court’s seminal privacy cases addressing the publication of “private facts,” Florida Star v.
B.J.F.,120  turns upon just such a means of intrusion analysis.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a rape victim sought damages against a tabloid for publishing
her identity, in violation of a Florida statute.  The tabloid asserted that the statute contravened the
Free Speech Clause, and the Supreme Court agreed.  The Court explained that B.J.F. could assert
no privacy claim because, inter alia, the Florida Star had obtained her identity from government
officials.  The Court also set forth a subject matter criterion —  the matter published must be one
of public significance — and easily concluded that B.J.F.’s identity was such a matter of public
significance.  However, the Court prohibited the state from setting aside a particular area as one
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
121  In Whalen v. Roe, as well, a means of intrusion analysis assumed a major role in the Court’s decision to
uphold a regulatory scheme that appeared to breach privacy expectations under another paradigm, namely the
confidential relationship paradigm.
122  Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 547.  Florida made state officials’ disclosure of such information a
crime.  Fla.Stat. § 794.03 (1983).  B.J.F.’s name had mistakenly been included in a press release placed in a
pressroom at a local courthouse.
123  Even assuming that the majority had really relied on a subject-matter analysis, W hite’s conclusion is
probably unjustified.  The Court has defined criminal activity as a matter of public concern, and thus some matters
that do not involve criminal activity might be considered sufficiently sensitive to give rise to  a publication of private
facts cause of action.  For instance, broadcasting the tape of two individuals engaged in love-making could perhaps
giver rise  to a privacy cause of action, even if being identified as the victim of a sexual assault would not.
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unfit for public discussion, and suggested that there may be no category of “private” information
inherently lacking in public importance.121
In dissent, Justice White vigorously disagreed with the majority’s conclusion.  He
certainly expressed disagreement with the breadth of the principle that the publication of
information obtained legally from the government could not constitute an invasion of privacy,
arguing that the principle should not apply when the government made the disclosure by mistake 
in violation of applicable law.122  However, the difference in the respective paradigms White and
the majority viewed as paramount provides a more cogent explanation of their disagreement. 
Unlike the majority, White focused on a subject matter inquiry — if anything can be considered
private, it is one’s victimization at the hands of a sexual assailant.  He wondered aloud how and
plaintiff could prevail in on any publication of private facts claim when dissemination of
information about such traumatic victimization could not constitutionally give rise to such a
cause of action.123  White, after starting his opinion by noting that, short of homicide, rape was
the ultimate violation of self, began the last section of his opinion as follows:
At issue in this case is whether there is any information
about people, which—though true—may not be published in the
press.   By holding that only "a state interest of the highest order"
permits the State to penalize the publication of truthful
information, and by holding that protecting a rape victim's right to
privacy is not among those state interests of the highest order, the
Court accepts appellant's invitation . . . to obliterate one of the
most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of
the publication of private facts. . . .  Even if the Court's opinion
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124  Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 550.
125  Granted that the subject matter paradigm might never become the issue if the Court rigorously applies
the means of intrusion principles that journalists may publish any information they lawfully obtain, but may not
publish any information obtained by violating the law.
126  See pages __-__ infra.
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does not say as much today, such obliteration will follow inevitably
from the Court's conclusion here.   If the First Amendment
prohibits wholly private persons (such as B.J.F.) from recovering
for the publication of the fact that she was raped, I doubt that there
remain any "private facts" which persons may assume will not be
published in the newspapers or broadcast on television.124
Of course, this formulation of the majority’s opinion completely disregarded the majority’s
resolution of the case based upon a completely different paradigm; the majority was quite
explicitly not deciding whether information on certain subject matters were peculiarly
sensitive.125  As we shall see, the Court’s repeated embrace of a means of intrusion analysis in
cases where individuals assert that publication of information has violated their privacy is no
mystery — other courts have done a poor job at consistently defining a sphere of privacy using a
subject matter paradigm.126
In sum, the Court has not fully explored the means of intrusion paradigm as a basis on
which to recognize rights to privacy that do not exist under other paradigms.  In the First
Amendment context, however, the Court has used a mode of intrusion analysis in an effort to
avoid the need to define “privacy” in terms of subject matter paradigm (and, as a result, has
largely doomed non-judicial efforts to define privacy in subject matter terms). 
D.  The Subject Matter Paradigm
Subject matter can be used to distinguish the private from the public.  Some information
is considered private because of the sensitivity of the subject matter it involves.  We should not
be asked to reveal the information, and publication of the information would seem to be of no
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127  Even Posner, who argues that individuals primarily wish to keep facts about themselves “private” in
order to manipulate others, acknowledges that there are some non-discreditab le matters that people do not want to
reveal.  These include a desire not to be seen naked, while performing excretory functions, or during sexual
activities.  See, Posner, supra  note __, at __ ; Haynes v. Alfred A. K nopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 , 1229 (7th Cir. 1993). 
Thus, for example, a federal court in California could reasonably have held that broadcasting a tape of Pamela
Anderson and her then-boyfriend Bret Michaels having sex gave rise to  a cause of action for publication of private
facts.  See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 27 Med. L. Rev. 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1998)(court held the
tape was one of legitimate public concern because Anderson was famous as a “sex symbol”).
128  The notoriety of the "boxers or brief" question directed to President Clinton during a 1994 appearance
on M TV  illustrates the point. See, e.g., Brian Balogh, An Evolving Presidency, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, at M1 ;
Howard Witt, Powell on MTV Show, Urges Condom Use to Prevent AIDS, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2002. For an
account of Clinton's MTV appearance, see Clinton Gives Revealing Answers to MTV Crowd, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26,
1994, at 3.
129  See note ___ infra.
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  § 652D. (One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.”).  
On a scholarly level, Erving Goffman seeks in part to define privacy by subject matter, but theorizing that
there are certain “informational preserves,” sets of facts about the individual that the individual expects to control
access to. GOFFMAN, supra  note __, at 38-39.
131  See Post, supra  note ___, at 980 (discussing Brents v. Morgan).  The disclosures about the intimate
relations between husband and wife found to be matters of public importance in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
might surely have been considered private in some contexts.  The fact that the details of the relationship allowed the
author of the offending book to illustrate his thesis regarding a significant social movement, the Great Migration of
African-Americans from the rural South to the urban North, was central to the court’s decision.  Similarly in Gaeta v.
New York Daily News, 62 N .Y.2d 340, 465 N.E.2d 802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984), intimate facts about the family
relationships appearing in the news story surely might not have been viewed as “matters of legitimate public
concern” had not one of the family members provided an excellent illustration of the consequences of the de-
institutionalization of the mentally ill.  Id. at ___.  (Granted, the question of whether the newspapers statements were
matters of public concern, was analyzed in conjunction with a defamation claim, not a privacy claim.
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legitimate public concern.127  Thus we could consider certain queries or publication of certain
information out of bounds in virtually all contexts.  Information about the kind of underwear a
person prefers would fit into such a category.128  We might consider other matters private
depending on the context.   For instance, genetic information might be considered private in the
context of decisions by employers or insurers.129  In the context of public discussion, courts have
sought to vindicate the right to privacy using a subject matter paradigm in constructing the
common law tort of publication of “private facts.”130  As we will see, not only is the
determination of whether a fact qualified as “private,” and thus actionable, highly contextual,131
courts rarely find any fact “private,” even those one might ordinarily consider quite intimate. 
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132  See Campus Communications v. Inc. v. Earnhardt, 820 So.2d 388 (Fla. App. 2002)(considering the
constitutionality of Fla. Stat. 406.135); See also Mich. Laws Ann. Chap. 750, § 750.160a (criminalizing knowing
photographing and public display of a decedent in a human grave).
133  Exemption 6 of the list of exemptions authorizing the government to withhold information sought under
the Freedom of Act, provides: “personnel and medical files and similar flies the disclosure of which would constitute
a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”  5 U.S.C. § 552.  See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 370-73 (1976)(quoting House Report)[S. Rep. No. 813, at 9 (“a balancing of interests between the
protection of an individual's p rivate affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public 's
right to governmental information”); H.R. Rep. No. 1497, at 11 (“by excluding those kinds of files the disclosure of
which might harm the individual.”) ; Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, ___ (D.C. Cir. 1974); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. V. United States IRS, 502 F.2d 133,  (3rd Cir. 1974).  The
Supreme Court has not been as clear.  Promise of confidentiality does not mean information is private, Washington
Post Co. V. HHS, 690 F.2d ___, 263 (D.C. Cir. 19__); Robles v. E.P.A., 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973).
134  Warren & Brandeis, supra  note ___, at ___.
135  Warren & Brandeis, supra  note ___, at ___.
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States have also sought to define “private” information, by enacting statutes defining “private”
information in terms of subject matter.  The statute found unconstitutional in Florida Star v.
B.J.F. was one effort to do so.  Recently, in response to the coverage of  the death of stock car
driver Dale Earnhardt, the State of Florida has sought to define autopsy photos as “private,” such
that journalists and others have no right to obtain them.132  The privacy exemption to the
Freedom of Information Act has to a large extent been defined in terms of subject matter.133
Other paradigms might effect our conclusions regarding the “private” or “public” nature
of particular subjects.  Our view of confidential relationships might shape our conception of the
type of matters that are of legitimate public interest.  For example, Warren and Brandeis, in their
seminal article on the right to privacy, focused on two aspects of privacy.  The first was
individuals’ control over the expression of their thoughts, emotions and feelings, which, as we
have seen, fits within the means of communication paradigm.  The second concern was men’s
ability to keep the “domestic” life within their household from becoming s subject of public
discussion.134  While Warren and Brandeis were not precise about defining the exact contours of
“domestic life” that were not a fit subject for public discussion, but they did note that it
encompassed, for example, whether a man dined with his spouse.135
Feminists, on the other hand, have attacked this conception of the private, at least to the
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136  Presumably, feminists would not take the same position with regard to public involvement in a pregnant
woman’s decision in matters regarding her fetus or parents’ child-rearing decisions.
137  CHARLOTTE PERKINS G ILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOM ICS 255, 258-60 (1898)(“At present any tendency
to withdraw and  live one’s own life on any plane of separate interest or industry is naturally resented, or at least
regretted, by other members of the family.  This affects women more than men, because men live very little in the
family and very much in the world.”)
138  CATHERINE A. MACK INNON, FE M IN IS M  UNMO DIFIED: D ISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW  92-102 (1987);
JUDITH WAGNER DECEW , IN PURS UIT OF PRIVACY: LAW , ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 81-87 (discussing
MacKinnon).
139  While Ruby Lee Daniels told her story about her husband’s abusiveness for purposes of a sociological
study of the Great Migration, there is no reason that she could not tell it as a part of explaining her life and
background in ways that might prove helpful to other in a similar condition.  Otherwise, Daniels might have been
precluded  from describing defining moments of her own life essential to the development of her own personality. 
See Anonson v. Donahue, ___ (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Winstead v. Sweeney, ______ (Tex. Ct. App. 19__).
A similar argument has arisen with regard to  “hostile work environment” employment discrimination cases. 
Rosen believes that much of the behavior designed to attract or retain the romantic interest of others in the workplace
should be viewed  as “private” and left to the discretion of those involved .  ROSEN , supra note 50, at 12-18, 23-24. 
McK innon, on the other hand, would presumably see such conduct as highly relevant to a very “public” matter,
women’s employment opportunities in the workplace.  CATHERINE MACK INNON, SEXU AL HARAS SM ENT O F WORKING
WOMEN 182  (1979). 
140  162 So.2d  474 (Ala. 1964).
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extent it seeks to shield from public scrutiny the interactions between husbands and wives.136 
Shortly after Warren and Brandeis penned their influential article, Charlotte Perkins Gilman
noted that privacy in the home was, as a practical matter, more available for men than for
women.137  More recently, Katherine McKinnon has asserted that feminism has had to “explode”
the private, which keeps some men out of other men’s bedrooms (that is, renders the relationship
between spouses immune from scrutiny).138  The relationship between men and women in
families are the public’s business.  Exploitation and oppression does not fall outside the public
sphere simply because it takes place within a household or a family.  Indeed, a spouse’s
discussion of another’s intimate, but discreditable behavior might be considered unfit discussion
by some, but is viewed by many as important for the public to hear.139
An Alabama Supreme Court case illustrates the divergence between the location and the
subject matter paradigms, and demonstrates that a subject matter analysis may lead to the
recognition of a privacy interest when a location analysis might suggest otherwise.  In Daily
Times Democrat v. Graham,140 the Alabama Supreme Court considered a claim that a newspaper
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
141  Id. at 381.
142  Id. at 383.  See, McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)(publication
of photograph showing exposed genitalia of player participating in a high school soccer game does not give rise to a
“publication of private facts” claim because individuals photographed in a public place for a newsworthy article”).
The court acknowledged this but rejected it asserting: “To hold that one who is involuntarily and instantaneously
enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be
part of a public scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust.”  Of course, if the location at issue were viewed as
plaintiff’s body, see note __ supra , perhaps p laintiff could have prevailed even under a location analysis.
143 Id. at 383. (“We can see nothing of legitimate news value in the photograph. Certainly it discloses
nothing as to which the public is entitled to be informed.”)(“Not only was this photograph embarrassing to one of
normal sensibilities, we think it could properly be classified as obscene, in that 'obscene' means 'offensive to modesty
or decency.' . . .or expressing to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, or decency forbid to be
expressed.”)
144  Id. at ___.  The Court could have focused on the means of intrusion. It might have found tortious either
intentionally photographing a person in such a predicament or showing such a picture to others, but allowed an
observer to describe the event. The permanence of the photograph could have been identified as the core privacy
problem. Such an approach would have protected Graham, the subject of the photograph, had the photographer
merely retained the photograph and shown it to a few friends rather than publishing the photograph in a newspaper.
145  Though it did not do so, the newspaper might have argued that the photograph had captured an unusual
event reminiscent of a popular image of then-widely acclaimed movie star Marilyn Monroe. THE SEVEN YEAR
ITCH (20th Century Fox 1955) (scene in which Marilyn Monroe's dress b lown upward as she stood over an air
vent).  Also the court, under an unconventional location analysis, might have considered the relevant location as the
human body, which is generally entitled to privacy protection, see notes __-__ supra , and accompanying text, rather
than as the physical milieu of the interaction, namely a “public” county fair.
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has tortiously published a private fact when it published a photograph of a woman whose dress
had been blown upward unexpectedly by an air vent, revealing her undergarments.  At the time
the picture was taken, both the woman and the photographer were in a public place —  a county
fair.141  A conventional location-based analysis would have suggested that the Daily Times
Democrat could publish the picture.142  Instead, the Court focused on the subject matter of the
picture, which it characterized as involving indecent exposure.143 The Court thus found
actionable the taking and distribution of photographs showing a person's underwear when the
subject neither intentionally exposed her underwear nor consented to the publication of the
photograph.144  While the Court gave precedence to the subject-matter paradigm, that choice was
not necessarily dispositive.  The Court might have held that the photograph captured a “matter of
public importance,” as the newspaper attempted to argue by adducing various definitions of
newsworthiness.145
So far, except for the discussion of Daily Times Democrat, I have largely discussed use of
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146  Thus, subpoenas may only request materials relevant to the criminal investigation.  United States v. R.
Enters., 498  U.S. 292, 301 (1991) ( "W here ... a subpoena is challenged on relevancy grounds, the motion to quash
must be denied unless the district court determines that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of
materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to  the general subject of the grand jury's
investigation."); Okla. Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)("The requirement of 'probable cause,
...' applicable in the case of a warrant, is satisfied in that of an order for production by the court's determination that
the investigation is authorized by Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought are
relevant to the inquiry."). 
147  See note ___ infra.  Occasionally, a statute will limit the use of certain intrusive techniques to
investigations of only certain crimes, ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (listing crimes that can be investigated by use of
electronic interception); see Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. Of the Judiciary, FBI
Undercover Operations, H.R. Doc 98-267, at 83-84 (1984)(recommending the same approach with regard to
regulating the use of undercover techniques).
148  E.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611 (1999); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963); Lauro v.
Charles, 219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding staged "perp walk" unconstitutional in certain circumstances
because it serves no law enforcement purpose).  
149  Subject matter restrictions can be particularly effective when defined in relation to particular activities.
For instance, some statutes prohibit consideration of genetic information or HIV-positive status with regard to
employment decisions.  Some state courts have also prohibited mandatory drug testing unless it is essential to
assessing an employee’s initial or continuing qualifications for the job.  Borse v. Pierce Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d
611  (3d Cir. 1992)(predicting Pennsylvania courts’ app lication of the common law tort of intrusion into
seclusion)(“It may be granted  that there are some areas of an employee’s life in which his employer has no  legitimate
interest”); Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W.Va. 1990)(mandatory drug test not based on individualized
suspicion allowable only with respect to those employees whose job “involves public safety or the safety of others”);
Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 23  (N.J . 1992)(mandatory drug testing must be confined to
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the subject matter paradigm to resolve questions involving the publication of information.  The
legal system employs the subject-matter paradigm to constrain the acquisition of information as
well.  Subject matter constraints have been imposed upon law enforcement intrusions.  The most
central constraint is the underlying Fourth Amendment rule that police may breach expectations
of privacy only if they can show probable cause to believe that the intrusion will reveal evidence
of a crime.  The other subject matter constraints on law enforcement tend to be quite modest,
focusing mainly on minimal relevance146 and law enforcement purpose.147  On occasion,
however, the requirement of law enforcement purpose can provide significant protection.148
The legal system structures some privacy protections in terms of subject matter
constraints on employers or insurers, who could otherwise coerce individuals into providing
information.  Some statutes make certain matters irrelevant to decision-making and bar
employers or insurers from asking prospective employees and policyholders about certain
matters.149  However, society generally need not address demands for information that involve
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jobs that posed a threat to co-workers, the workplace or the public at large).  Similarly, some matters may be deemed
irrelevant for purposes of compiling consumer credit histories. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS:
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN T HE COMMON LAW  202-03 (1988); TU RKING TO N & ALLEN, supra note
108, at 351.  And finally, in the criminal context, rape shield laws deem victim’s sexual histories irrelevant in sexual
assault prosecutions.  See, e.g., Fed R. Evid. 412; see, Michelle J . Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to
Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 51, 86 (2002)Cites needed. 
150  Thus, much of the Federal Trade Commission’s efforts to protect privacy on the Internet seeks to ensure
that those who solicit information by way of the Internet comply with the privacy policies that they have adopted.  In
other words, the Commission seeks to ensure that those privacy policies are not decep tive, and brings actions against
companies that violate their privacy policies for engaging in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of
section 5 of the Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45  (authorizing the Commission to prevent “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce”). [cite cases: Ely Lilly, Microsoft, Guess Jeans].
151  Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968) (noting that love and friendship require different
levels of disclosure; without the ability to differentiate the level of disclosure of facts about oneself, there can be no
love or respect).
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neither coercion (such as "no information, no job" or "no information, no credit") nor
deception.150  Not only can individuals otherwise control their own disclosure of personal
information in response to the information demands of others, but the ability to selectively
provide such information is a necessary element of intimacy.151  We may define our circle of
friends by our willingness to share private information about ourselves with them.  Perhaps it is
for such reasons that the subject matter mode most often addresses dissemination of, rather than
access to, information. 
Privacy interests in autonomy are also often defined by subject matter.  Thus, the
constitutional right of privacy protects the rights of individuals to make decisions with regard to
certain subjects: procreation, termination of pregnancies, and end of life decisions.  Granted,
many of the constitutional protections might be characterized as protecting locations, namely the
human body, or confidential relationships, namely families and the roles families traditionally
fulfill.
Reliance on a subject-matter paradigm may sometimes leads the legal system to reject a
claim of privacy that could successfully be asserted under a competing paradigm.  Both Wyman
v. James and Whalen v. Roe illustrate this proposition.  Recall that Wyman v. James involved a
constitutional challenge to social workers’ visits to the homes of AFDC recipients.  Under a
location paradigm, the aid recipient would unquestionably have possessed a privacy interest of
the highest order, demanding that no entry be effected without either a warrant issued on
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152  Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. at 318-19 (“The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as
from state sources, is fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has
appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that
tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the aid it dispenses.”).
153  One commentator has argued that in the  same era that Warren and B randeis were  arguing for a right to
privacy that protected domestic matters and the Supreme Court began taking privacy seriously (see, In re Boyd), the
poor, immigrants and single mothers were losing their ability to safeguard the privacy of their domestic affairs as a
result of government programs reflecting a view that the welfare of children, the condition of urban habitats, and
public health were matters of public concern.  Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man's Home is his Castle?:” Reflections on
the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM . &  MARY J.
WOMEN &  L. 175, 175- 183 (2002). 
154  For a  discussion of “duty to report” statutes, see Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White Collar Police
Force: “Duty to Report” Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM  &  MARY B ILL RIGHTS JOU RN AL 3 (2003).
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probable cause or the existence of circumstances establishing an exception to that requirement. 
While, as previously noted, the Court’s relied upon a means of intrusion approach in analyzing
James’ expectation of privacy, the Court also invoked the subject matter paradigm as well.  The
majority concludes that aid recipients have greatly diminished expectations of privacy in their
homes because the conditions within their homes became matters of public concern once they
begin receiving aid under the AFDC program.152  This subject-matter aspect of the Court's
analysis suggests that aid recipients have no right of privacy in the condition of their homes given
the relevance of those conditions to both their continued eligibility for AFDC aid and an
assessment of the aid's efficacy.153 
Similarly, in Whalen v. Roe, a strong norm of confidentiality would ordinarily prevent a
physician from disclosing information relating to a patient’s medical condition.  Nevertheless,
the Court did not find any privacy violation in the mandatory disclosure of drug prescriptions
doctors ordered for patients, and indeed the plaintiffs did not really seriously argue that it did. 
The subject matter paradigm trumped the confidential relationship (much in the same way
mandatory reporting statutes trump such relationships).154  Patients had no expectation of privacy,
at least vis-a-vis the government, with regard to medical prescriptions, because the narcotics laws
make the ordering of prescriptions a matter of public importance (access to such information is
an essential element of the regulation of both medical practice and pharmaceuticals).
The Supreme Court, as an interpreter of the Constitution, has not used subject matter to
define any realm of privacy, at least insofar as individuals claim that their privacy has been
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breached by the publication of information.   The Court could have held that information
obtained illegally is tainted, and that no one privy to such tainted information has a First
Amendment right to further dissemination the information.  Had it done so, the restrictions the
other privacy paradigms impose on the acquisition of information would protect privacy quite
effectively.  For example, states could enforce prohibitions on wiretapping or trespassing by
precluding publication of information gathered as a result illegal intrusions accomplished by such
prohibited means.155  However, the Court has not adopted this approach, because the First
Amendment discourages prohibitions on publication of truthful information regarding matters of
public importance.  As a result, then, when publication of information is at issue, the subject
matter paradigm, which recognizes no sphere of privacy, will generally trump other privacy
paradigms effectuated by the laws violated in the process of obtaining the information. 
In short, while subject matter constraints have some usefulness in limiting the acquisition
and use of certain information, they have little with regard to the publication of information. 
Privacy could be defined in terms of the issues fit for public discussion, but, given the federal and
state courts’ current approaches, the prospect for the establishment of a robust definition of
privacy in that context is not high.  The lack of a subject matter definition of the “private” serves
to undermine, though certainly not destroy, the use of other paradigm to protect privacy in terms
of the information publicly disseminated about an individual.
E.  The Confidential Relationship Paradigm
 For members of society, interaction with others is inevitable and necessary on both a
personal and a commercial level.156  Few have no need for the emotional or spiritual support
provided by other human beings.  And we can satisfy our material needs only by interacting with
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banks, communications providers, public utilities, credit companies, and supermarkets.157 
However, individuals must retain the power to be selective, to establish special relationships with
some that they do not wish to have with others.158  Various theorists characterize our interactions
with others in terms of  zones of intimacy.159 A significant aspect of such special relationships,
both personal and commercial, is the provision of information about ourselves.  Thus, we need to
engage in differential disclosure — revealing to some that which we withhold from others.  We
may disclose certain matters only to others in the same family, religious group, or alcoholics
anonymous group.  By safeguarding the means of communications from breach by outsiders, the
legal system may protect information we divulge to such confidants.  However, such “means of
communications” protections do not protect us if the confidant can be forced to reveal the
information, decides to reveal the confidence in the absence of compulsion, or forms a special
relationship with us precisely to obtain confidences for disclosure to others.
Privacy protections could secure privacy by precluding people in whom citizens confide
from divulging their confidences.  For instance, society might impose upon medical personnel a
duty keep confidential the information they obtain about patients in the course of rendering
care.160 Similarly, banking records could be, and indeed are,161 protected by laws prohibiting bank
officials from divulging account information to government or private individuals in all but
limited circumstances.  The scope of such privacy rights against prospective private intruders
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does not turn on subject matter considerations like “relevance,” which plays a central role in the
subject matter mode of privacy analysis outlined above. Even if a customer's account information
has great relevance to the customer's fitness for a political office he seeks, the bank cannot
divulge the information. Conversely, if a person obtains account information without breaching
the protected bank-customer relationship (by, for example, finding the depositor’s misplaced
checkbook), he does not violate bank secrecy laws by publishing such information.162  Neither,
ordinarily, will the scope of legally enforceable privacy expectations associated with confidential
relationships turn on issues of physical location, the means of intrusion, or the means of
communication.163
Formal evidentiary privileges, such as spousal, attorney-client, priest-penitent, and
doctor-patient privileges, do, of course, protect privacy by precluding the government from
requiring the confidant to divulge the confidence imparted.164 Most formal privileges have an
accompanying professional or ethical obligation precluding the confidant from voluntarily
disclosing the information.165  These privileges and obligations of confidentiality have mostly
been developed at the state level, but the federal courts have acted consistently with such
developments.166
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Though the courts have generally held that individuals have no legitimate expectation,
recognized by the Fourth Amendment, that their confidants will keep their confidences, the
courts have exhibited some reluctance to extend that principle to matters confided in the course
of a confidential relationship.  In Weatherford v. Bursey,167 an undercover police operative
attended a meeting between a criminal confederate and his lawyer.  Though the government did
not attempt to introduce any statements made at the meeting into evidence, the defendant argued
that the undercover operative’s mere presence at the meeting impermissibly undermined his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.168  The Court, concerned about adopting a prophylactic rule
that might “for all practical purposes” unmask undercover operatives, ultimately found that the
operative’s attendance of the meeting was constitutionally permissible.169  However, the Court
did declare that in such situations the undercover operative must not report his observations
during such attorney-client meeting to any of his law enforcement colleagues.
Courts have held that one spouse does not lose the marital communications privilege
because the other surreptitiously allows a third party to eavesdrop, even though, ordinarily,
spouses lose the privilege if third parties, even eavesdroppers, are privy to the conversation.170  In
State v. Lively,171 the Washington Supreme Court held that a confidential informant could not
attend alcoholics/narcotics anonymous meetings to identify drug addicts who continued selling
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illegal drugs.172  Indeed, Lively involves a relationship that, while “confidential” in the sense I use
that term in this paper, is not covered by a formal evidentiary privilege in most jurisdictions.173 
Except in the most critical circumstances, courts may well prohibit undercover operatives from
breaching privileged relationships.174 
The cost of such privileges and accompanying obligations can be quite high, as I have
noted elsewhere.175   Thus, the number of such privileges is greatly limited.
Outside the realm of evidentiary privileges and their accompanying confidentiality
obligations, the common law generally does not impose confidentiality obligations on those
entrusted with information.176  Despite calls for a more generalized recognition of a common law
cause of action for breach of confidentiality,177 courts in the United States have yet to recognize
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-47-
such a legal claim, and appear unlikely to do so.178  Legislatures have been active in this area,
enacting database protection statutes, and there is some judicial movement toward recognizing a
limited common law right to seek redress for breaches of confidentiality.
The standard form that privacy legislation has taken in recent years is the database
protection statute.179  For example, over the last 40 years, Congress has enacted the Privacy Act
of 1974,180 the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,181 the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978,182 the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988,183 the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act,184 and Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act.185 
Recently, the Department of Health and Human Services promulgated privacy regulations under
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the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.186  Database protection statutes govern
the conduct of database custodians, who obtain personal data from individuals in the course of
providing a service or through use of their governmental authority to obtain information by
compulsion.187  Thus, generally these files result from a confidential relationship or the
equivalent, in which an individual is providing access to information that he or she may not
normally make public, often solely to secure a service needed in a complex society such as ours. 
The statutes impose a weak confidentiality obligation on the database custodian.  The custodian
has no obligation to turn away all inquiries seeking information in the database,188 and many
statutes provide standards that allow, or require, disclosure of confidential information once a
requester makes a particular showing of need for the information.189  Thus, often such
information does not become totally unavailable to courts, as it does when information is
protected by a traditional evidentiary privileges.  At the same time, however, the statutes serve to
recognize that the information is private, and in doing so establishes that individuals have a right
to preclude the database custodian from disclosing the information solely at its discretion.  Such
statutes embody a legislative rejection of the principle that dominates the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, that those who confide in others have no legitimate
expectation that their confidences will be disclosed.  In other words, while the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence establishes that the decision to disclose confidences lies within the
confidant’s discretion, data protection statutes severely limit confidants’ discretion.  These data
protection statutes then, control confidants and specify both the uses to which those confidants
can put individuals’ information and the circumstances under which such information can be
disclosed to others.
The Supreme Court has ignored this paradigm when addressing privacy.  In perhaps its
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most woeful lapse in defining legitimate expectations of privacy in the Fourth Amendment
context, the Court has as a practical matter assumed that any information individuals’ willingly
disclose to one they willingly disclose to all.  This failing is the consequence of the Court’s
refusal to recognize any limitation on a person’s ability to disclose to others matters revealed to
him in confidence.
The Court refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy that one in whom a
person confides will not reveal the information to law enforcement officers.190  No only does this
rule cover criminal confederates, but also entities such as banks and public utilities.191  Thus, in
United States v. Miller,192 the Court held that acquisition of banking records did not constitute a
“search,” explaining that such conduct breached no legitimate expectation of privacy.  In the
Court's view, a depositor who shared financial information with his bank could have no
legitimate expectation that law enforcement officials would not thereby gain access to the
information.  If a person exposes information to at least one other person, he assumes the risk of
exposing that information to law enforcement. Such reasoning provided the basis for the
controversial Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) program proposed by the
Department of Justice.  Law enforcement officers would encourage public utility employees to
report suspicious items they observe during the course of their daily work-related routines.193 
Indeed, at least on a theoretical level, Supreme Court doctrine is even more troubling. In
cases like United States v. Miller, the Court purports to apply the principle that the police are
entitled to any information available to the general public.  The logic of the Court’s holdings in
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such cases suggests that once an individual provides information to a confidant, no legally
enforceable privacy principle precludes that confidant from revealing that information to any
member of the general public, a journalist, or to the public at large.  Theoretically, the Court does
not recognize any variation of a person’s legitimate expectations of privacy based on the identity
of the intruder.194  Accordingly, citizens have no greater expectation of privacy against the police
(operating without a warrant and/or probable cause or the equivalent) than they do against
journalists or any member of the public who happens to take an interest in them.
In practice, the situation is far less grim. While the Court claims to refer to general
expectations of privacy in determining the scope of legitimate expectations of privacy vis-a-vis
law enforcement, it really defines the general expectation of privacy vis-a-vis law enforcement
based on its own balancing of the needs of law enforcement and privacy.195 The Court does not
appear to take seriously any evidence indicating the public's actual judgment about the level of
privacy expectations society should consider reasonable.196  Moreover, the Court's holding that 
depositors lacked an expectation of privacy in their banking records did not leave citizens
powerless to guard such records from private snoops. The Court would rarely, if ever, have
occasion to apply its own anemic Fourth Amendment conception of the reasonable expectation of
privacy to claims against private intruders. 
A recognition that a confidential relationship may exist despite the absence of an
evidentiary privilege need not require empowering individuals to preclude their confidants from
testifying in all but a few limited circumstances, as is the case when an evidentiary privilege
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applies.  Rather, the Court need only recognize that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists and
thus merely require law enforcement officials to either make the showing required to obtain a
warrant or advance some regulatory exception to the warrant requirement before allowing
government officials to breach those confidential relationships.  Certainly law enforcement
officers should be required to make a showing of either reasonable suspicion or probable cause
before deceptively entering into a confidential relationship to obtain information from a
suspect.197 
Sometimes, reliance on the confidential relationship paradigm might defeat a privacy
claim that would otherwise appear sound under another paradigm.  The federal wiretapping
statute provides an illustration.  As we have seen, Congress declared, by statute, that citizens
possess legitimate expectations of privacy in their telephone conversations, and thus that third
parties may not intercept such conversation (except in unusual circumstances).  However, parents
may listen in on their minor children’s telephone conversations by means of an extension
phone.198  Indeed, many courts hold that within the marital home, spouses may listen in on each
other’s phone calls by use of an extension phone.199  In both circumstances, Congress, in drafting
the statute, or the courts, in interpreting it in the context of broader legal norms, have recognized
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that in the domestic context there may be no legitimate expectation of privacy in telephone
conversations.200
Confidential relationships play an important role in defining the sphere of autonomous
decision-making protected by the right of privacy as well.  Private non-commercial associations
play a critical role in individuals' mental health and enhance their freedom from government
domination.201  Indeed, perhaps much of the due process right of privacy may be explained not so
much as an effort to protect individual decision-making with regard to certain matters, but as an
effort to protect certain autonomous units, most notably families, from state interference.202
The Supreme Court has recognized the critical importance of private associations, even
those that, unlike religious institutions, receive no explicit recognition in the Constitution. 
Perhaps most explicitly, the Court has done so in construing the Constitution to include a
guarantee of the “freedom of association.”  The Court has observed: “[C]ertain kinds of personal
bonds have played a critical role in the culture and tradition of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the state.”203   In several cases defining the First
Amendment freedom of association, the Court has recognized private associations as valuable
and acknowledged that they merit respect from government.204  Courts have recognized
associational rights even when doing so frustrates attainment of goals of the highest order, such
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
205  See, New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (19__)(rejecting facial attack on
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the law as applied to them breached their freedom of association).  See also , Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000)(Boy Scouts right to exclude gay scout leaders upheld on free speech grounds).
206  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 280 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (striking down  Oregon law requiring students to
attend public schools because it “unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (petitioners
right to teach the G erman language, “and the right of parents to  engage him to  so instruct their children,” are within
the liberty protected by the due process clause).
207  Poe v. Ullman, 367 U .S. 497 (1961)(Harlan, J ., dissenting)(“[i]t is one thing when the State exerts its
power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry, but it is quite another when,
having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal
law the details of that intimacy”); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, ___ (1965) (focus on protecting marital
intimacies and the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms”).  Indeed, it was not until Eisenstadt v. Baird , 405 U.S.
438 (1972), that the Court divorced the constitutional right of privacy protecting the use of contraceptives from the
marital relationship. 
208  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  And at
times the protection of the autonomy of the family unit even supercedes that of particular individuals to have
“familial” relations with children.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)(giving parents right to preclude child
from seeing grandparents); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U .S. 110 (1989). 
Indeed, in Lawrence v. Texas, — U .S. —, 123 S .Ct. 2472 (2003), the Court explained that in Bowers the
majority had demeaned the constitutional challenge to sodomy laws by characterizing it as raising a right to engage
in certain sexual conduct, and re-characterized the issue as one protecting the ability of individuals to define for
themselves interpersonal relationships of love and affection.  Id. at 2478, 
209  See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW  OF TORTS § 280 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON , ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS § 122, at 907-10 (1984).
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as ending racial and gender discrimination.205 
Moreover, even quite distinct constitutional rights subsumed under the right of privacy
seem to arise out of judicial concerns about state intrusions into family life.  Thus, the earliest
privacy cases addressed parents rights to raise their children.206  Even the right to use
contraception recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut was initially grounded in a concern about
government interference in family decision-making.207  The right to privacy has protected family
relationships in other ways.208  The law in non-constitutional areas reflects similar concerns about
government intrusion into the realm of family life.  For example, tort law also reflects a concern
about family as a private enclave, establishing parental immunity that serves to limit judicial
intrusion into parental decision-making.209  
In short, the confidential relationship paradigm underlies privileged relationships and
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providers very robust protection to communications made in the course of such relationships. 
More generally, however, the paradigm has been underappreciated by American courts, and in
the absence of a privileged relationship, duties of confidentiality are rarely recognized either in
tort law or in the context of the Fourth Amendment.  However, the political branches of
government have, since the mid-1970's, regularly turned to a confidential relationship paradigm
by enacting statutes to govern disclosure of confidences by various categories of confidants. 
F.  The Paradigms’ Interrelationships
As the above analysis suggests, the five privacy paradigms, while different, are certainly
not mutually exclusive.  Sometimes a court may resolve a case under one paradigm, but the
manner in which it performs its analysis under the paradigm may reflects insights derived from a
competing one.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s view of the home as a warranting heightened
protection location under a location analysis, surely reflects its appreciation of the home as a
locus of confidential relationships, namely familial relationships.  Moreover, several paradigms
may suggest the same result.  The easy privacy cases are those in which all of the privacy
paradigms suggest one result.  Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co.210 provides an
extraordinary example of such a circumstance.  (In part the case is extraordinary because the
court adverted to each of the five privacy paradigms in analyzing the case.)  Desnick involved
journalists’ hidden camera investigation of an eye clinic.  The proprietor claimed that the use of
hidden cameras violated his right to privacy.  In rejecting the claim, Judge Posner offered the
following explanation:
No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life were
publicized in the present case. There was no eavesdropping on a
private conversation; the testers recorded their own conversations
with the Desnick Eye Center's physicians. There was no violation
of the doctor-patient privilege. There was no theft, or intent to
steal, trade secrets; no disruption of decorum, of peace and quiet;
no noisy or distracting demonstrations. 
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In the passage, Posner touches on virtually all of the paradigms of privacy I have outlined above. 
He analyzes the journalists’ actions in terms of the means of communication paradigm, noting
that they engaged in “no eavesdropping on private conversation.” He discusses the means of
intrusion, noting, among other things, that the journalist’s activities involved “no disruption of
decorum.”  He also found the subject matter paradigm relevant, noting that the journalists did not 
publicize “embarrassingly intimate details of anybody's life” and did not seek to steal any trade
secrets.  A confidential relationship mode of analysis also suggested no breach of a privacy
interest, as Posner noted “there was no violation of the doctor-patient privilege.”  Moreover,
Posner used a location analysis as well, he spent the most time resolving the claim that the
journalists had engaged in a physical trespass, ultimately rejecting the claim because consent,
even under false pretenses, constitutes a defense to a trespass cause of action.  In short, the
journalists had not gained any information by non-consensual physical intrusion upon a “private”
location.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the privacy paradigms often suggest conflicting results,
and it is in such cases that the privacy issues are the most difficult to resolve.  The next section
will address one such case.
II.  Bartnicki v. Vopper: Wiretapping’s Fruits and Clashing Privacy Paradigms
Bartnicki v. Vopper forced the United States Supreme Court to consider whether
recipients of tape recordings containing illegally intercepted conversations can be prohibited
from disclosing the contents of those conversations.  In other words, the Court had to determine
whether the Electronic Communication Privacy Act’s prohibition on disclosing or using
information resulting from an illegal wiretap violated the Free Speech Clause.  Bartnicki thus
required the Court to resolve a clash between competing privacy paradigms that could potentially
suggest conflicting results.  The subject matter paradigm might suggest that the First Amendment
must protect the recipient’s decision to disclose the contents of such a conversation, at least if the
illegally intercepted conversation involved a matter of public concern. By contrast, the means of
communications paradigm, as embodied in ECPA, would suggest that such a conversation must
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be considered “private,” regardless of the public significance of the substance of the
conversation, and must not be divulged, even by a third party not involved in illegally
intercepting the conversation.  The Court ultimately found the subject-matter analysis paramount,
but once again failed to define the scope of “matters of legitimate public concern” with any
precision.  I will canvass the Court’s attempts to define the sphere of legitimate public concern,
which, ironically it has addressed most extensively in developing the constitutionally-mandated
“fault” requirements applicable to defamation actions.  I will then suggest an alternative approach
which may serve to place some limits on the concept.  
Bartnicki arouse out of contentious negotiations between a teachers’ union and a school
board211 that received substantial local media attention.212  During the negotiations Gloria
Bartnicki, the union’s chief negotiator, discussed the status of the negotiations with Anthony F.
Kane, the president of the local union, by cell phone.213  The conversation covered several aspects
of the negotiations, including the timing of a propose strike, difficulties created by public
comment on the negotiations, and the need for a dramatic response to the school board’s
intransigence.214  During the conversation, Kane said:
If they’re not gonna move for three percent, we’re gonna have to
go to their, their homes . . . To blow off their front porches, we’ll
have to do some work on some of those guys.  (PAUSE).  Really,
uh, really and truthfully because this is, you know, this is bad news.
(UNDECIPHERABLE).215
Several months later, the parties accepted a non-binding arbitration proposal. 
Unfortunately for Kane and Bartnicki, their cell phone call had been intercepted and recorded
surreptitiously, in violation of federal and state wiretapping laws.  The unknown interceptor
placed a tape recording of the conversation in the mailbox of Jack Yocum, the head of a local
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217  Brief for Respondents Frederick W. Vopper, Keymarket of NEPA, Inc. and Lackazerne, Inc.
(hereinafter “Vopper Resps. Br.”) at 8.  Indeed, at least one board member had been informed about the existence of
the tape while in a local tavern even before Yocum told Board  members. Id. at 7.
218  A second station then broadcast the content of the conversations, followed by the local newspapers
publishing accounts of the tape’s contents.
219 Two other cases raised similar issues: Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463  (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated,
121 S. Ct. 2190 (2001), and Peavey v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d  158 (5th Cir. 2000).
220 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5725.
221  It also provides for liability for using or endeavoring to use the contents of an illegally intercepted
conversation if the person knows or has reason to know that the information was obtained in violation of the section. 
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taxpayer’s organization critical of the union.216  Yocum recognized Kane’s and Bartnicki’s voices
on the tape.  Yocum then played the tape for some members of the school board (who apparently
did not publicly discuss the tape).  The Board did, however, discuss the tape at the next board
meeting and formally requested that law enforcement authorities conduct a criminal
investigation.217  Subsequently, Yocum delivered the tape recording to local radio commentator
Frederick W. Vopper, another critic of the Union.  Vopper broadcast the tape of the Bartnicki-
Kane conversation.218
Bartnicki sought damages for Vopper’s disclosure of the contents of the conversation,
invoking the rights of action established by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,219 and
its state counterpart, the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act.220  Not only
do the statutes prohibit wiretapping, but to effectuate the prohibition, they impose liability on
recipients of illegally wiretapped conversations, even if the recipients played no role in the
interception of the conversation.  In particular, such individuals are subject to liability for
disclosing the contents of an intercepted conversation to others if they knew or should have
known that the information had been obtained in violation of the wiretapping laws.221  Vopper
raised a First Amendment defense to the statutory liability, alleging that the prohibition
unconstitutionally limited his First Amendment rights.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the First Amendment protected Vopper
from liability because the Bartnicki-Kane conversation had involved matters of public concern,
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
222  See, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982) (accepting the argument in upholding statutes
outlawing possession of child pornography).
223  121 S. Ct. at 1762.
224  Id. (Bartnicki).  Moreover, with regard to the wiretapping statute, the eavesdropper could be punished
because rarely was the identity of the eavesdropper unknown.    Id. at 1763. (B artnicki).  In addition, there  was little
reason to believe that prohibiting recipients of the information from disclosing it to others would discourage
eavesdroppers from plying their trade.  Id. (Bartnicki). In any event, concluded the Court, the “drying up the market”
theory rested on mere speculation about serious harms.  Id. at 1763-64. (Bartnicki).
225  Id. at 1764.  (B artnicki)
226  Id. at 1764-65 (Bartnicki)
-58-
and also because both parties to the conversation were “public figures” who should expect public
scrutiny.  Justice Stevens noted two interests served by the statutory provisions aimed at
disclosure of illegally-wiretapped conversations.  First, such provisions remove the incentive for
parties to illegally intercept communications, by drying up the market for the products of such
illegal activity.222  Second, the provision sought to minimize the harm to victims that would result
from further dissemination of the information obtained in violation of the privacy rights of the
participants in the telephone conversation.223  The first objective, while laudable, was more
appropriately pursued by imposing sufficiently serious sanctions against the eavesdropper. 
Indirectly discouraging the eavesdropper by limiting the speech of the citizens who received
information from the eavesdropper, but had otherwise committed no crime, was impermissible.224 
The majority found the second rationale for the prohibition against disclosure of the
contents of conversations intercepted by illegal wiretaps more appealing.  The Court noted that
permitting unrestrained wiretapping might have a chilling effect on private speech, and that “the
disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy
than the interception itself.”225  The Court said, however, that the concern about aggravating the
harm done by eavesdroppers could not justify precluding non-complicit recipients from
disclosing it when the conversation regarded matters of public concern.226  This forced the Court
to explain its rationale for concluding that the Bartnicki-Kane conversation involved matters of
public concern. 
Stevens explained that “the subject matter of the conversation was a matter of public
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227  In doing so, he distinguished the substance of the Bartnicki-Kane conversation from trade secrets and
domestic gossip.  Presumably trade secrets fall outside the sphere of matters of legitimate public importance not
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would be destroyed by unlimited  disclosure.  See generally, Posner, supra  note ___, at ___.
228 121 S. Ct. at 1760.  As noted above, this treats the fact that the means of communication Bartnicki and
Kane used for their conversation was “private” rather than “public” as completely irrelevant, contrary to the rationale
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Court’s own seminal ruling in U.S. v. Katz.
229 121 S. Ct. at 1765 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, which in turn was quoting Thornhill v. State of Alabama,
310  U.S. 88 (1940).  This description, of course, is virtually unbounded, almost everything is of public concern.  It is
not clear whether this description limits public concern to government, regulations by government, or the potential
need for government regulation.
230 121 S. Ct. at 1765.
231 121 S.Ct. at 1766, 1767 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Moreover, even the passing of the danger by virtue of
the passage of time does not mean that the participants in the conversation have a legitimate interest in the privacy of
their conversation.  In addition, Breyer continued, the Court should not require editors to assess the impact of the
passage of time upon expressed criminal intentions, particularly because such assessments would have to made
quickly under deadline pressures.  
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concern.”227  He elaborated: “If the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a
public arena — during a bargaining session, for example — they would have been newsworthy. 
That would also be true if a third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki making the same
statements to Kane when the two thought they were alone together.”228  Stevens invoked Justice
Brennan’s statement in New York Times v. Sullivan that the nation is committed to the
proposition that debate on public issues must be “uninhibited, robust and wide open.”  He also
quoted Time, Inc. v. Hill: “[f]reedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.”229  He concluded that “[t]he
months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming
Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public concern, and that respondents
were clearly engaged in debate about that concern.”230
Justice Breyer, writing a bit more cautiously in a separate concurrence, declared that the
First Amendment protected Vopper because Bartnicki and Kane could assert no legitimate
private interest in conversations concerning criminal activity that posed a threat to public
safety.231  Breyer, like Stevens, also focused on Bartnicki and Kane’s public stature. They were
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not private figures in whose professional lives the public lacked any legitimate interest.  Rather,
Bartnicki, as chief negotiator, and Kane, as union president, were “limited public figures” who
had voluntarily thrust themselves into a public controversy, namely the contract that was to cover
public school teachers at the local public high school.232  Breyer found critical the confluence of
the minimal legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject of the conversation (criminal threats
to the physical safety of others) and the legitimate public interest in public figures like Bartnicki
and Kane.  Emphasizing this confluence, he explained, would allow the Court to establish a
constitutional privilege to publish unlawfully intercepted conversations like that between
Bartnicki and Kane, without creating a “public interest” exception that would engulf the federal
and state wiretapping statutes’ privacy protections.233
Justice Rehnquist wrote for the dissenters, and accorded paramount importance to the
means of communication paradigm — the contents of “private” conversations could not be
divulged merely because they concerned a “public” subject matter (i.e., a matter of legitimate
public interest).234  Toward the end of his dissenting opinion, Rehnquist discussed the conclusion,
reached by both sets of Justices in the majority, that the tape’s content involved a matter of
public concern.  Perhaps, he asserted, he could agree with the majority’s assertion that the union
officials’ statements would have been newsworthy had they been made in a public arena, like a
bargaining session.  However, Rehnquist argued, the “private” setting in which those statements
were made, a telephone conversation between the two, could not be ignored — Bartnicki and
Kane had no intention of contributing to any public debate in the course of their telephone
conversation.  He argued that the Constitution should not protect the broadcast of private
conversation without the consent of the participants, “[e]ven where the communications involve
public figures or concern public matters.”  Even in such circumstances personal conversations
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237  Previously, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)(the “Pentagon Papers” case),
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meant to remain confidential were private and worthy of protection.  “Although public persons
may have foregone the right to live their lives screened from public scrutiny in some areas, it
does not and should not follow that they have abandoned their right to have a private
conversation without fear of having them intercepted..”235
Perhaps the majority correctly concluded that the First Amendment required it to create a
subject-matter-based exception to the liability ECPA imposes upon disclosing information
obtained from another’s breach of a private “means of communications.”  However, the realm of
“private” subject matter, in the Free Speech Clause context, has long been quite narrow and ill-
defined.  As a result, the Court will find itself hard pressed to limit the disclosure of the fruits of
illegally wiretapped conversations by third parties.236  After Bartnicki, the definition of “matters
of public concern” remains largely undefined, even in the context of the disclosure of
information derived from illegally-intercepted conversations.  Several potential definitions could
be embraced by the Court.  Bartnicki did not require the court to define the scope of matters of
legitimate public concern with precision, there were a number of bases on which the Court could
have concluded that the Bartnicki-Kane discussion was of legitimate public concern.  The
conversation involved potential criminal activity, the two participants in the conversation were
public figures, and the conversation related directly to a highly public controversy.  I will suggest
a “subject matter” test that might be employed to determine when the fruits of illegal wiretaps
may be disclosed.  The test might perhaps be relevant in other circumstances.237
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A court could adopt one of three major approaches, issue-focused, personality-focused, or 
institution-focused, in identifying matters of public importance.  The issue-focused approach
seeks to define particular facts or matters as “public” or “private” based on the subject matter to
which they relate.  Typically, courts that adopt an issue-focused approach seek to determine
whether the issue in question is one of legitimate public concern.238  Many courts employ such a
test in tort cases alleging publication of private facts.  Moreover, such a test has been proposed,
and in at least one jurisdiction is used, in attempting to identify speech that merits the greatest
protection in defamation actions.239
In the publication of private facts context, courts virtually never conclude that published
facts are not matters of legitimate public concern.240  And indeed, some courts have refused to
recognize the cause of action precisely because of the difficulty of identifying “private” facts in
which the public lacks a legitimate interest.241  Similarly, in the defamation context, Justice
Brennan urged his Brethren to adopt an issue-focused approach in seeking to determine when the
heightened protections against defamation liability set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan would
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apply.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,242 writing for a three-Justice plurality, he asserted that
the New York Times standard should apply to “all discussions and communications involving
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous.”243 A majority of the Court rejected that approach, fearing that virtually any
matter in which the media took an interest could be considered one of legitimate public
concern.244   And the courts’ conclusions on the scope of matters of legitimate public importance
appear to bear out the fears of the Justices who rebuffed Justice Brennan’s entreaties.245
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During their marriage, Haynes had physically and emotionally abused Daniels. In the twenty years following the end
of the marriage, Haynes had remarried and become an exemplary person, even becoming a deacon in his church.
However, Haynes' abuse of Daniels illustrated a larger trend that the offending book's author had sought to describe
— namely the widespread familial dysfunction attendant the migration of five million African-Americans from the
rural South to the Northern cities between 1940 and 1970. See id. at 1232-33. Similarly, in Gaeta v. New York News,
465 N.E.2d ___, 802-06 (N.Y. 1984), a defamation case, information about a couple's relationship and the death of
their son was deemed a matter of public importance. The husband 's transfer from a mental institution to a nursing
home illustrated  a broader trend regarding the  effects of a  government de-institutionalization program, and thus his
life was a matter of public concern. The cause of his initial institutionalization (which was falsely ascribed to his
wife's affair with another man and their son's consequent suicide) was relevant to the story. See Gaeta v. N.Y. News,
Inc., 465 N.E.2d 802-06 (N.Y. 1984).
246  Warren & Brandeis, supra  note ___, at 214-16 (“there are persons who may reasonably claim as a right,
protection from the notoriety entailed by being made the victims of journalistic enterprise .  There are others who, in
varying degrees, have renounced the right to live their lives screened from public observation.  Matters which men of
the first class may justly contend, concern themselves alone, may in those of the second be the sub ject of legitimate
interest to their fellow citizens.”)
247  See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Virgil v. T ime, Inc ., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th
Cir. 1975); Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, 27 M ed. L. Rptr. 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
248  New York Times v. Sullivan (“public officials” must establish “actual malice”); Curtis Publishing v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)(extending New York Times v. Sullivan to “public figures); Gertz v. Robert W elch, Inc .,
418  U.S. 323 (1974)(defining general purpose public figures and limited purpose public figures). 
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A second approach, one that is personality-centered, can be employed to distinguish
newsworthy from non-newsworthy matters.  Under such an approach, the question of  whether a
matter is public or private depends on the categorization of the individual to whom  the
information relates.  Though Warren and Brandeis suggested such an approach,246 and some
publication of private facts cases appear to turn on the status of the individual discussed,247 the
courts appear not to have adopted this approach with regard to the cause of action for publication
of private facts.  However, the personality focused approach provides the basic mode of analysis
in defamation cases.  Thus, under U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, “public officials” and “public
figures” may prevail on a defamation claim only if they establish the defamer’s “actual
malice”;248 others, i.e., private figures, may prevail if they merely establish the defamer’s
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
249  Id. at ___ (Gertz)
250  In part, the Court seeks to address this issue by creating the concept of an involuntary public figures. 
Ord inarily, a person becomes a “public figure” only by seeking to influence the public.  However, involuntary public
figures attain “pub lic figure” status despite avoiding public attention, such persons are deemed public figures only
because public events or public issues cannot be fully discussed without focusing public attention on them.  Gertz,
418 U.S. at ___; Dameron v. Washington Magazine, 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(only air traffic controller on
duty when commercial jetliner crashed on approach to Dulles airport deemed an involuntary public figure).
251  See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, 27 Med. L. Rptr. 1097 (C.D. Cal. 1998)(dissemination
videotape of actress engaging in intercourse is speech involving a matter of public concern because the actress is a
sex symbol).
252  Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Am endm ent Theory,  1977 AM . B. FOUND. RES. J. 523;
Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26  HASTINGS L.J. 631,___-___ (1975); see Secrets and Lies, supra note ___, at
788  & nn. 191-94. 
-65-
negligence.249  With respect to high public officials and private figures who wield enormous
power or influence, even the most personal details of their lives are considered “public” for
purposes of identifying the appropriate standards of defamation liability.  While such a
personality-focus test does treat many matters as “private,” unlike the issue-focused tests applied
in the publication of private facts and defamation contexts, it might make “private” some matters
that really are of public importance.250  More significantly, the test may deem “public” matters
than are quite private.  The focus on the “public” status of the person to whom the information
relates may, in effect, preclude public officials and public figures from having any “private”
sphere protected from public scrutiny and “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” public debate.  
Thus, wiretapped marital conversations between an elected official and his or her spouse could
be considered a “matter of public concern” by virtue of the public status of one of the parties to
the conversation.251
A third approach for distinguishing “public” and “private” matters might be described as
institution-focused.  Because one purpose of the Free Speech Clause is allowing the citizenry to
monitor the operations of government,252 we might consider “public” any matter at issue in a
government proceeding or involving any governmental institution.  While the scope of “public”
matters is likely to be quite broad under such an approach, given the pervasiveness of
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253  See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)(seminal article noting this trend and
recommending recognition of property rights in certain government benefits and licenses); see also , Seth F. Kreimer,
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law,  140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)(“the night watchman state is dead in America, if indeed it ever lived . . . [i]n the  late
twentieth century, the bureaucrat --- who dispense benefits and licences, who hires and fires, who plans health care
programs or fiscal policy --- has replaced the police officer, judge, or soldier as the icon of government”).
254  424 U.S. 448 (1976).
255  Id. at 454-55.  However, the Court has arguably taken such an approach with regard to private citizens
who are candidates for office.  Monitor Patriot v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)(extending New York Times v.
Sullivan to candidates for elective office because “it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to  the conduct of campaigns for po litical office”).  Granted such a result
can also be reached by the personality-focused approach set forth in Gertz.
256  For instance, Brennan’s dissent in Firestone focused on exactly this point.  Citizen review of the judicial
system is essential to democratic government and, for that reason alone, the breathing room for error that New York
Times v. Sullivan affords should apply anytime media entities reported on judicial proceedings. Firestone, 424 U.S.
at 473-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  His dissent in Hutchinson v. Proxm ire did not address this issue in part because
he viewed the immunity of a legislator under the Speech and Debate Clause as dispositive.  See generally William P.
Marshall & Susan Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 169,
182 (citing Hutchinson as an example of a case in which the personality-focus of the test for heightened protection
for defamation defendants meant that “many reports on matters essential to an educated citizenry do not receive the
highest level of scrutiny”).
257  Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Landmark Commun. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978)(“[t]he operation of the Virginia [Judicial Inquiry and Review] Commission, no less than the operation of the
judicial system itself, is a matter of public interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the newsmedia”); Nebraska
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government in our lives,253 it would provide more robust limits than those supplied by the issue-
focused tests the courts have used in the publication of private facts and defamation contexts.
This third, institution-focused approach has not been used widely, if at all, in publication
of private fact cases.  Justice Brennan advocated such an approach in defamation cases in Time,
Inc. v. Firestone,254 where a wealthy socialite sued over an inaccurate description of her divorce
proceedings.  While the Court used its newly-minted personality-focused test, and found the
plaintiff a private figure,255 Justice Brennan argued that plaintiff should have had to establish
“actual malice.”  He argued that citizen review of the operation of the judiciary is critical to
democratic governance, and thus that the statements about the court proceedings were about
“public” matters, not “private” ones.256  Moreover, in cases involving First Amendment
limitations on publication of facts about parties to judicial proceedings, a majority has arguably
taken an institution-focused approach.  Thus, the Court has repeatedly held that states cannot
preclude publication of matters related to judicial proceedings.257   I have previously
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art1
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976); B.J.F. v. Florida Star,  (the article generally . . . involved a matter of
paramount public import: the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported  to
authorities”), see generally, Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430  U.S. 308 (1977); Smith v. Daily M ail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).  (Similar arguments are  made in the context of the right of access to trials.)
258  See page ___ supra .
259  See note 118 supra .  Indeed, the rationale for the Freedom of Information Act is that the citizenry has a
right to know of government activities.  Cite needed.
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characterized the approach as a means of intrusion approach,258 but it could also be characterized
as a subject-matter approach that makes the “public” nature of a fact turn on whether the fact is
discussed in the context of government action.259
Bartnicki requires that the courts distinguish “public” from “private” matters, and none of
the approaches outlined above is satisfactory.  In the context of delineating the First Amendment
protections for third-party disclosure of the fruits of illegally wiretapping, courts should protect
the use or disclosure of such material only if the intercepted conversation involves the use of
power.  Such an approach will allow third parties to disclose particularly important information,
but at the same time will impose important constraints upon the further disclosure of illegally
wiretapped information, information obtained by violation of the norms of privacy established by
a statute embodying the means of communication paradigm.  Unlike, the issue-focused tests as
applied by the courts, surely there will be many conversations that, while they may involve
matters of legitimate public interest, will not involve the use of power that the citizenry has a
legitimate interest in monitoring.  Unlike the personality-focused test, it allows public officials
and public figures to have some conversations that, if illegally wiretapped, may still not be
disclosed.  Certainly many of the private conversations in which public officials and public
figures engage do not involve the use of power over others.  The proposed test is somewhat
similar to the institution-focused approach, except that not everyone who has some interaction
with the government will have their interaction with the government subjected to public scrutiny. 
Certainly the exercise of political power would qualify as the exercise of a type of power
over a substantial segment of the public.  Thus, conversations regarding the exercise of political
power would qualify as those that concern a public matter such that third parties who receive
information regarding the conversation would have a First Amendment right to disclose that
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
260  43 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 43 § 211.7 (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representative of all employees in such unit for the purposes of co llective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment”).
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information.  The exercise of economic power should also qualify as a “public” matter, such that
the contents of illegally-recorded private conversations could be disclosed by those not complicit
in the initial interception.  Thus conversations about the manner in which a corporate enterprise
will make decisions would fit within such as rule.  However, in some circumstances, the exercise
of power over a substantial segment of the public should not be sufficient to give third-parties a
First Amendment right to disclose the contents of an illegally-wiretapped conversation.  Thus
while a religious leader may exercise substantial authority over members of their congregations,
the exercise of such power should not give rise to a right to disclose the contents of an illegally-
wiretapped conversation between religious leaders or between religious leaders and members of
their congregations.  The autonomy of religious groups is so essential, that religious organization
should retain some immunity from public scrutiny, even if at times this allows religious leaders
to abuse their authority.
Bartnicki can serve to illustrate the approach suggested above.  The conversation in
Bartnicki did involve the exercise of power over a substantial segment of the public, and thus,
arguably, if the Court will allow a “subject matter” inquiry to trump a privacy interest defined in
terms of the means of intrusion, the case was an appropriate one in which to conclude that the
conversation was in some sense a “public conversation.”  Bartnicki and Kane, the participants in
the illegally-intercepted conversation, could and did wield substantial power with regard to a
major public contract in the school district.   The public employees union that the two
represented had been granted a special power by law, indeed a monopoly power,260 to represent
those employees in a matter that is of great public interest, namely, the terms and conditions of
employment for the teachers in that school district.  Moreover, the particular discussion that was
intercepted was one in which Bartnicki and Kane were discussing strategies for using their
resources to reach a favorable outcome in the contract negotiations with school authorities.  As
the respondents noted in Bartnicki, the case involved assertion of a privacy interest by
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261  See Vopper Resps. Br. at 32 (“this case involves the assertion of a privacy interest, not by the victim of
a violent sexual assault, but by participants in a telephone conversation about the public’s business; [t]he fact that
they hoped, or even expected, that their discussion would remain confidential does not constitute an ‘interest of the
highest order’”).
262  Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999), provides a second illustration.  In that case a
member of the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives, John A. B oehner, spoke by cell phone with
three other members of the Republican leadership regarding disposition of ethics complaints against then-Speaker
Newt Gingrich that were then before the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. The participants
discussed stra tegy regarding an expected Ethics Subcommittee announcement of Gingrich's agreement to accept a
reprimand and to pay a fine in exchange for the committee's promise not to hold a hearing.  The phone call was
illegally intercepted by two private citizens, who forwarded the tape to James A McDermott, the ranking Democrat
on the House Ethics Committee.  McDermott then delivered copies of the tapes to  the New York times, the Atlanta
Constitution Journal, and Roll Call.  After  accounts of the conversation were published, Boehner sued McDermott
for disclosing the contents of the illegally wiretapped information when he knew or should have known that the
conversation had been intercepted  illegally.  McDermott asserted that imposition of such liability would deprive him
of his First Amendment rights.  The D.C. Circuit resolved the case by upholding the cause of action, thus giving
precedence to the ECPA’s means of communication paradigm rather than the subject paradigm. However, if the
subject matter paradigm is paramount, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bartnicki, surely Boehner v. McDermott is
a case in which the conversation should be considered a  matter of legitimate public interest.  The proposed test
would produce that result, the conversation clearly involved the exercise of power, political power, over others. 
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“participants in a telephone conversation about the public’s business.”261 262
CONCLUSION
The legal system’s treatment of privacy can best be understood by recognizing that
privacy has not been developed as a unitary, comprehensive concept, but instead in terms of
several paradigms — the paradigms of location, means of communication, means of intrusion,
subject matter, and confidential relationships.  The legal system relies upon different paradigm at
different times.  While the paradigms sometimes suggest the same result, often they do not. 
Thus, as we have seen, the selection of the paradigm is a critical step in resolving privacy claims. 
Much of the judicial development of privacy law can justly be criticized for over-emphasizing
the paradigm of location, and under-emphasizing competing paradigms, such as the confidential
relationship and means of intrusion paradigms.  Judicial doctrine can also be criticized for
adopting a particularly privacy-destroying version of the location paradigm.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court has made a basic judgment to privilege the subject
matter paradigm used in the First Amendment context in addressing the publication of
information over the competing paradigms, in particular the means of communications paradigm,
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that protect privacy by placing legal constraints on the acquisition of information.  Ultimately,
however, the subject matter paradigm does not provide very robust privacy protections, and the
Court has not seriously sought to define the realms of “public” and “private” in the context of the
publication of information.  In the context of the fruits of illegally wiretapped conversation, a
subject matter test that focuses on whether the intercepted conversation involves the use of power
over a substantial segment of the public provides a subject matter test that is protective of First
Amendment interests while providing robust privacy protections.
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